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The  effects  of  conceptual  categorization  on  early  visual  processing  were 
examined in  six  experiments  by measuring  how familiar  and  individually-
identifiable  auditory  stimuli  influenced  event-related  potential  (ERP) 
responses  to  subsequently  presented  visual  stimuli.  Early  responses  to  the 
visual stimuli, as indicated by the P1 component, were modulated by whether 
the auditory and the visual stimuli belonged to the same basic-level category 
(e.g., dogs) and whether, in cases where they were not from the same basic-
level category, the categorization levels were congruent (i.e., both stimuli from 
basic level categories versus one from the basic level and the other from the 
subordinate level). The current study points to the importance of the interplay 
between categorization  level  and basic-level  category congruency in cross-
modal object processing.
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The  human  brain  categorizes  information  from  the  world,  both  to 
understand  the  information  and  to  generate  predictions.  We  learn  to  slot 
objects into different conceptual categories, such as that a poodle belongs to 
the Dog category and a  dog belongs to the Animal category.  Knowing the 
category of an object helps us to infer features that may not be perceivable 
immediately or directly. For example, knowing that the object is a dog allows 
us to infer that it can bark, even though we have not heard it do so. Given that 
a dog is an animal, we can readily apply the features that belong to the Animal  
category to the dog. Moreover, if we also know that the dog is a poodle, we 
can further apply the features that specifically belong to the Poodle category to 
the dog.
Research  suggests  that  there  is  a  hierarchical  structure  comprising 
different levels of category inclusiveness and specificity for the knowledge 
space  in  humans  (Medin,  1989;  Cohen  &  Lefebvre,  2005).  Whereas  the 
concept  animal  belongs  to  the  superordinate  level  of  abstraction,  poodle 
belongs to the subordinate level. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-
Braem (1976) pointed out that these abstraction levels are not equally easy to 
access. They argued that we tend to recognize objects at the basic level, where 
we find a balance between inclusiveness and specificity. Categorizing objects 
at more specific levels allows us to predict their characteristics more precisely. 
For instance, a poodle behaves differently from a porcelaine, but the trade-off 
is  that  categorization  may  take  more  processing  time  and  effort  at  the 
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subordinate level (Murphy & Smith, 1982).
In an experiment designed to examine the features participants added 
when moving from a less specific to a more specific level, Rosch et al. (1976) 
asked  participants  to  describe  objects  at  the  subordinate,  basic,  and 
superordinate levels. They found that the number of additional features was 
larger when moving from the superordinate level to the basic level than when 
moving  from  the  basic  level  to  the  subordinate  level.  In  subsequent 
experiments,  they  found  that  the  basic  level  objects  shared  similar  visual 
images; people handled them with similar motor programs; and concepts at the 
basic level were also easiest to access and were learned earlier by children 
(Rosch et al., 1976). Hence, objects from the same category share the largest 
number  of  common features  at  the  basic  level.  Tanaka  and  Taylor  (1991) 
pointed out that most of the added features comprise perceptual information, 
rather  than functions.  They quantified four types of additional  information, 
including  additional  object  parts,  modified  object  parts,  different  object 
dimensions (e.g.,  size and color),  and behaviors (or functions). They found 
that the first three were more critical than the last one. Moreover, for domain 
experts, who were known for their rich knowledge about the object categories 
at the subordinate level, the type of perceptual information that became more 
important  with  more  specific  categorization  depended  on  the  domain  of 
expertise.  For  example,  dog experts  tended to  add in  more  object  parts  as 
additional  features  at  the subordinate  level,  whereas  bird experts  tended to 
modify attributes listed at the basic level. Interestingly, the bird experts were 
more likely to use the subordinate category names to describe birds, but the 
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dog experts did not show a preference for particular category level names. 
Both  expert  groups  added  more  features  to  the  subordinate  level  than  did 
novices.
Of course, relatively few humans are bird experts, but most are experts 
in perceiving human faces. We understand that a face comprises two eyes, one 
nose and one mouth and that the two eyes must be next to each other and 
above the nose, which in turn is above the mouth. Both the nose and the mouth 
must  be  roughly  aligned  to  the  center  of  the  eyes.  These  are  the  feature 
configurations of a face, but we are usually not satisfied with merely knowing 
that the object is a face. We prefer to individually recognize the face. Feature 
configuration,  such  as  the  distance  between  the  eyes  and  the  eye  height 
relative to the mouth, plays an important role in face recognition (Tanaka & 
Sengco,  1997;  Goffaux & Rossion,  2007;  Young, Hellawell,  & Hay,  1987; 
Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). Changing the eye height in an image can lead 
people to  believe that  the face belongs to  a  different  person (Haig,  1984). 
Feature  configuration  is  important  when  moving  from  the  basic  level  of 
classifying  an  image  as  a  face  to  the  more  specific  subordinate  level  of 
determining face identity (Barton, Press, Keenan, & O’Connor, 2002).
Although most studies of conceptual categorization have used visual 
stimuli, Adams and Janata (2002) showed that auditory stimuli are subject to 
the same categorization level effects as visual stimuli. They asked participants 
to  match  visually  presented  words  with  either  pictures  or  sounds.  They 
manipulated the category levels of the words to form four conditions for each 
modality. For example, for a sound or picture of a crow, the subordinate-level 
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match was crow; the subordinate-level mismatch was sparrow; the basic-level 
match  was  bird;  and  the  basic-level  mismatch  was  cat.  Note  that  in  the 
subordinate-level mismatch condition, words still matched with the visual or 
auditory stimuli at the basic level (e.g., both crows and sparrows are birds). 
The results indicated that participants were faster and more accurate for basic 
level  stimuli  than  subordinate  level  stimuli  for  both  pictures  and  sounds. 
Moreover,  although  participants  were  more  accurate  and  faster  matching 
pictures  than sounds,  there was no significant interaction between stimulus 
modality and categorization level.
1.1 Conceptual Categorization in the Brain
Object  categorization  appears  to  occur  both  within  and  beyond  the 
primary sensory cortices. For example, Adams and Janata (2002) showed that 
the  inferior  frontal  regions  in  both  hemispheres  responded  to  object 
categorization regardless of stimulus modality. Responses in the fusiform gyri 
also corresponded to the categorization level, though it was restricted to the 
left hemisphere for auditory stimuli.
Lee  (2010)  instructed  participants  to  remember  sounds  and pictures 
from different categories without instructing them about the category level at 
which  they should  discriminate  the  sounds.  Hence,  most  participants  were 
expected to use the basic level by default. Lee contrasted brain responses to 
the  different  basic-level  categories  and  found  that  the  regions  recruited  to 
discriminate animate basic level categories were more lateral on the STG than 
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the inanimate discriminative regions. In a second experiment, Lee extended 
the comparison to the visual modality. He compared the discriminative areas 
for  animate  versus  inanimate  categories  when  the  stimuli  were  sounds  or 
pictures. Modality-specific early sensory areas were found for both sounds and 
pictures (e.g., the middle portion of the middle temporal sulcus for sounds, and 
the lingual  gyrus  for  pictures)  and there were also areas  activated by both 
sounds and pictures (e.g., the right supplementary motor area).
Studies of the structure of the perceptual system support a multimodal 
processing model.  Information is  processed within  each modality and later 
bound  into  a  unitized  perception  either  by  direct  connections  or 
synchronizations  between  different  modalities  or  by  convergence  zone(s) 
(Calvert & Thesen, 2004). The conceptual system is argued to be multimodal 
in that object representations are also distributed among modalities (Barsalou, 
1999; Rogers & Patterson, 2007).
Rogers and Patterson (2007) adopted the Rosch et al. (1976) paradigm 
to  compare  normal  participants  and patients  with  semantic  dementia  (SD). 
While they replicated Rosch et al.'s findings with the normal participants, the 
SD patients showed better performance at the superordinate level than at the 
basic and subordinate levels. These findings contradict the idea that processing 
first  occurs  at  the  basic  level  before  spreading  to  other  levels.  The 
superordinate categorization was preserved among the SD patients and only 
the basic  or  subordinate  levels  of  categorization were impacted.  Rogers  & 
Patterson (2007) proposed a parallel  distributed model.  Following the view 
that object representations are distributed across different regions in the brain, 
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they  argued  that  the  representations  are  not  only  stored  in  the  modality-
specific  regions.  Though  regions  in  sensory  cortex  store  modality-specific 
features, the concepts that link the features are stored in the anterior temporal 
cortex and are represented in distributed patterns according to the similarities 
among  features.  The  basic  level  advantage  is  explained  based  on  the 
distinctive-and-informative principle. The inputs from the sensory areas share 
more similarity at the basic level than at the superordinate level. For example, 
pears  share  similar  shapes  with  lightbulbs.  However,  pears  and  lightbulbs 
differ  greatly in  color,  texture,  function,  and so on.  The representations  of 
pears and lightbulbs may be similar in the “shape”-processing regions. But 
representations in other regions will be very different. Their representation in 
the  anterior  temporal  cortex  will  be  distinctive.  The  subordinate  level 
representations in the anterior temporal cortex share more structural similarity 
with  each  other  and  require  more  precise  input  from  the  sensory  areas. 
Therefore,  objects  are  identified  faster  at  the  basic  level  in  the  category 
verification task. They further suggested that when receiving input from the 
sensory areas, the superordinate level concepts begin to be activated earlier 
than the basic or subordinate levels, but are slower to reach the threshold for 
output  production.  However,  if  forced  to  respond  before  any  threshold  is 
reached,  the  participants  recognize  the  objects  more  accurately at  the 
superordinate level.
1.2 EEG and ERPs
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In light of the behavioral evidence for different categorization levels, 
potential brain electrophysiological signatures that reflect this distinction have 
also been examined. Three ERP components that have been used as tools to 
examine object  categorization,  the P1,  N170, and P2, are  described in  this 
section.
1.2.1 P1
The P1 is a positive ERP deflection that occurs between 50 and 150ms 
after visual stimulus onset. The scalp distribution is bilateral over occipito-
temporal electrode sites with sources believed to be in  the lateral  occipital 
cortex,  extrastriate  visual  cortex,  ventral  visual  cortex,  and  around  the 
posterior fusiform area (Mangun, Buonocore, Girelli, & Jha, 1998; Mangun et 
al., 2001).
The P1 is sensitive to the physical features of visual stimuli, such as 
contrast,  spatial  frequency,  and  luminance.  For  example,  Ellemberg  and 
colleagues  (2001)  tested  responses  to  stimuli  with  different  contrasts  and 
spatial  frequencies  and  the  P1  component  was  elicited  by  all  spatial 
frequencies in the experiment except the highest (i.e.,  16 c per degree). At 
each  spatial  frequency,  the  P1  component  appeared  at  low  contrast,  its 
amplitude rapidly increased as the contrast increased to a medium level, but 
did not increase further as contrast was increased. Indeed, at the highest tested 
spatial frequency, the P1 amplitudes experienced a sharp drop. The authors 
suggested that this P1 amplitude profile resembled features one may expect 
from magnocellular responses. Osaka and Yamamoto (1978) reported that as 
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stimulus luminance increased, the P1 latency decreased. However, Johannes, 
Münte, Heinze, and Mangun (1995) failed to find an effect of luminance on P1 
latency, but did find that the higher the stimulus luminance the larger the P1 
amplitude.
Stimulus feature complexity also increases P1 amplitude. Martinovic, 
Gruber, and Müller (2008) examined the effects of different features on the P1 
component,  which  included  surface  details,  visual  complexity,  and  color 
typicality.  They  found  that  adding  surface  details  and  increasing  visual 
complexity enhanced the P1 amplitude,  but  the P1 latency was shorter  for 
more complex stimuli than less complex ones. However, presenting an object 
with an atypical color did not affect the P1 amplitude or latency.
Most important for the present work is evidence that the P1 component 
reflects  object  recognition  processes.  For  example,  inverted  faces  elicited 
larger P1 amplitudes and/or P1 latencies compared to upright faces (e.g., Itier 
and Taylor, 2004b; Allison et al.,  1999; Taylor, 2002) even though inverted 
and upright faces shared the same low-level physical features, which suggests 
that  a  higher  level  of  visual  processing  was  involved.  Furthermore, 
Freunberger and colleagues (2008a) presented images with different levels of 
distortion. By reducing the distortion, half of the images resolved into pictures 
of objects while the others remained meaningless patterns. Participants were 
instructed  to  respond  as  quickly  and  accurately  as  possible  when  they 
recognized the objects in the pictures. Comparison of the ERP responses to 
pictures of living objects, non-living objects, and distorted images revealed 
that  the  P1  amplitudes  elicited  by  the  distorted  images  were  significantly 
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larger than the responses to the living and the non-living object images.
The P1 amplitude is also affected by attention. Early research tended to 
focus  on  the  effect  of  spatial  attention  effect  on  the  P1  amplitude.  For 
example, in a spatial cueing paradigm (e.g., Van Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977), 
participants  were  instructed  to  fix  their  eyes  on  the  screen  center  while 
attending to either the left or the right visual field. Across trials, visual stimuli 
appeared in the attended or the unattended visual field. The participant’s task 
was to detect visual targets within the attended visual field, ignoring stimuli 
appearing  in  the  other  visual  field.  Each  stimulus  appeared  briefly  (e.g., 
200ms) to avoid saccades. ERP responses to the stimuli appearing in the same 
visual  field  were  compared  between  the  attended  and  the  unattended 
conditions.  The  P1  component  elicited  by  the  stimuli  was  larger  over  the 
contralateral hemisphere when the visual field was attended compared to when 
it was not attended. 
Allocation of  attention during an experiment  can be manipulated in 
different  ways.  For  example,  attention  can  be  allocated  to  different  visual 
fields in different blocks (e.g., Mangun et al., 2001) or allocated on a trial-by-
trial basis (e.g., Eimer, 1998; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991). In the trial-by-trial 
allocation experiments, attention was directed by a symbol (e.g.,  an arrow) 
placed at screen center. Most of the time, the symbol correctly predicted where 
the next  visual  stimulus  would appear,  but  occasionally the prediction was 
incorrect.  Comparison  of  the  P1  responses  between  the  validly  and  the 
invalidly cued trials when the visual stimuli were presented in the same visual 
field  revealed  that  valid  trials  elicited  a  larger  P1  over  the  contralateral 
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hemisphere.  Given attention was directed to the relevant visual field in the 
valid trials, but not in the invalid trials, attention accounts for the difference in 
P1 amplitudes.
Attending to different visual fields from block to block and directing 
attention using symbols involves voluntary allocation of attention. However, 
attention  can  also  be  directed  automatically  to  a  visual  region  by  briefly 
presenting a stimulus in the peripheral visual field. The effects of attention in 
this case are slightly different from those of voluntary attention allocation. In a 
study by Hillyard, Luck, and Mangun (1994), four dots at the four corners of 
the screen marked the possible target locations.  One dot disappeared 50ms 
before the target was presented. This acted as a valid cue most of the time 
(75%). Although the behavioral results showed that RT was facilitated for the 
valid trials compared to the invalid trials, no cue validity effect was observed 
for P1 amplitudes. As noted by Briand and Klein (1987), peripheral cueing 
versus symbol cueing may involve different attention systems.
The invalid cue trials in the spatial cueing paradigm also reveal the P1 
response elicited by the visual field that does not contain a stimulus. The P1 
response on these trials can be compared to valid trials in which attention was 
correctly directed away from the visual field without a stimulus. P1 amplitudes 
over the hemisphere ipsilateral to the target stimulus were larger on invalid 
than on valid trials. This means that the attention effect on P1 amplitude does 
not require a stimulus input (Mangun et al., 2001). 
Klimesch (2011) proposed that  the P1 component reflects  inhibition 
such that when more inhibition is needed, the P1 amplitude is larger. For the 
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hemisphere  contralateral  to  the  stimulus  presentation  field,  the  P1  reflects 
inhibition  processes  that  enhance  the  signal  to  noise  ratio  (SNR).  For  the 
ipsilateral hemisphere, the P1 component reflects reduction of task-irrelevant 
activations.  He  (Klimesch,  2011)  also  pointed  to  the  link  between  the  P1 
amplitudes and stimulus complexity. Using inhibition theory, he argued that 
longer word length, inverted or scrambled faces as compared to upright faces, 
and distorted images, all increased the complexity of the stimuli and therefore 
required  more  inhibition  efforts  in  stimulus  processing.  Therefore,  the  P1 
amplitudes were larger for long word length, inverted faces, scrambled faces, 
and distorted images.
To  summarize,  the  P1  component  is  related  to  object  recognition, 
which is linked to conceptual categorization. The P1 amplitude differentiates 
between meaningless patterns and meaningful objects. It reflects efforts to slot 
objects  into  conceptual  categories.  Therefore,  unfamiliar,  distorted,  and/or 
complex objects, all of which require more categorization effort, increase P1 
amplitude. The P1 component is also subject to selective attention modulation. 
Increasing  attention  allows  better  stimulus  processing  and  the  effect  of 
selective  attention  on  the  P1  component  may  reflect  facilitation  of  object 
categorization.
1.2.2 N170
The N170 is a negative-polarity ERP component that typically peaks 
approximately 170ms after the onset of a visual stimulus. It is distributed over 
the occipital temporal area with sources in the fusiform gyrus and the superior 
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temporal areas (e.g., Itier & Taylor, 2004a; Herrmann, Ehlis, Muehlberger, & 
Fallgatter,  2005). The N170 is affected by physical features such as spatial 
frequency,  contrast,  size,  and visual  noise  (e.g.,  Rossion  & Jacques,  2008; 
Eimer,  2011).  Eimer  (2000b)  found  that  the  viewing  angle  of  a  face  also 
affects  the  N170;  full  front  upright  view (0  degree)  and  profile  view  (90 
degree)  elicited similar  N170 amplitudes,  whereas  the back side-view (135 
degree) and back view (180 degree) elicited smaller N170s.
In addition, the N170 component is more sensitive to faces than other 
objects (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Rossion & Jacques, 
2008). Specifically, the N170 component elicited by human faces is larger than 
those elicited by non-face objects, such as houses, cars, furniture, and human 
hands  (Bentin  et.  al.,  2007;  Bentin  et.  al.,  1996;  Carmel  & Bentin,  2002; 
Kovacs,  et.  al.,  2006). See Thierry,  Martin,  Downing, & Pegna (2007) and 
Bentin  et  al.  (2007)  for  discussions  of  whether  Interstimulus  Perceptual 
Variance accounts for the N170 face effect.
Comparing the N170 elicited by human faces and by faces of other 
species  (e.g.,  monkeys,  dogs)  reveals  that  the  N170  differs  in  amplitude 
between humans and other animals (e.g., Eimer, 2000b; Itier & Taylor, 2004a; 
Carmel & Bentin, 2002; Rousselet, Macé, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2004; de Haan, 
Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002; Itier, Van Roon, & Alain, 2011; Bentin et al., 1996; 
Gajewski  & Stoerig,  2011).  For  example,  de  Haan,  Pascalis,  and  Johnson 
(2002) compared the N170 responses to human faces versus monkey faces and 
found a smaller N170 for human faces. Itier et al. (2011) also found that ape,  
cat,  and dog faces elicited larger N170s than human faces. Putting faces in 
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natural scenes, Rousselet et al. (2004) compared human faces from different 
races with faces from various species (e.g., mammals, birds, fish, and reptiles) 
and  still  observed  a  tendency of  smaller  N170  to  human  faces.  However, 
Gajewski and Stoerig (2011) reported a larger N170 to human than to monkey 
faces and a larger N170 to monkey faces than to dog faces. Similar results 
were also found in the earlier study (Bentin et al. 1996). The inconsistency 
across experiments might be due to the diversity of the face stimuli (Gajewski 
&  Stoerig,  2011).  Gajewski  and  Stoerig  (2011)  used  human  faces  from 
African, Asian, and Caucasian, dog faces from a wide range of breeds (e.g., 
Fox  Terrier,  Bull  Terrier,  German  Shepard,  Husky,  Cocker  Spaniel,  and 
Maltese), and monkey faces ranging from Chimpanzee to Loris. Bentin et al. 
(1996) had excluded non-human primate faces in the comparison “because of 
their  similarity to human faces”.  A larger N170 for human faces tended to 
come from studies using a wide range of animal faces, though diversity of the 
faces  did  not  necessarily lead  to  a  larger  N170 for  the  human faces  (e.g., 
Rousselet et al., 2004; Itier et al., 2011). The N170 differences between human 
faces and other animal faces were more reliable among studies examining the 
face inversion effect (as discussed below)..
Distortion of faces also modulates the N170 response. For example, 
violating  the  up-down  feature  arrangement  of  a  face  (i.e.,  face  inversion) 
increases the N170 amplitude and latency (Rossion et al., 2000; Itier, Latinus, 
& Taylor,  2006;  Itier  et  al.,  2011;  Macchi  Cassia,  Kuefner,  Westerlund,  & 
Nelson, 2006). As face inversion preserves the physical features of a face but 
disrupts its configuration, the inversion effect shows that the N170 is sensitive 
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to face configuration. Interestingly, de Haan et al. (2002) observed the typical 
N170 inversion effect for human faces, but inversion of monkey faces did not 
modulate  the  N170  amplitude.  Itier,  Latinus,  and  Talor  (2006)  compared 
inversion effect of human faces,  cars,  houses,  ape faces, chairs  and human 
eyes.  While inversion delayed the N170 for all  stimulus categories, it  only 
increased the N170 amplitude for human faces. Itier et al. (2011) also found 
that inversion enhanced the N170 for human faces, but did not affect the N170 
for ape faces. The N170 amplitudes for upright ape faces were similar to those 
for  the  human  upright  faces.  The  study  further  revealed  that  inversion 
decreased  the  N170  amplitude  for  dog  faces  and  cat  faces.  These  results 
suggest that not only the N170 is sensitive to face configuration, but it is more 
sensitive to the configuration of human faces.
Although studies indicate that infants are better in recognizing upright 
than inverted human faces (see Nelson, 2001 for review), inverted faces do not 
elicit a different infant-N170 than upright faces even though human faces do 
elicit  larger  infant-N170  than  the  non-human  faces  (Haan,  Pascalis,  & 
Johnson, 2002). Taylor, Batty, and Itier (2004) reported that the onset of the 
inversion effect  on the N170 can  be as  late  as  mid  childhood.  Hence,  the 
sensitivity of the N170 to human face configuration might require experience. 
This  relatively  late  development  of  the  sensitivity  to  human  face 
configuration is in line with research on how experience modulates the N170. 
Repeated presentation of human faces from the same view can decrease the 
N170 amplitudes, but associating the faces with the person's information can 
reduce the repetition effect (Heisz & Sheddon, 2008). Presenting faces of the 
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same person, but from different views can also eliminate the repetition effect 
(Ewbank,  Smith,  Hancock,  & Andrews,  2008).  Moreover,  for  people  with 
perceptual expertise in certain object categories, the N170 is larger for objects 
of their expertise (Tanaka & Curran, 2001).
The N170 amplitude increase with expertise in an object category is 
related  to  conceptual  categorization  levels  because  subordinate-level 
categorization elicits a larger N170 than basic-level categorization (Tanaka, 
Luu, Weisbrod, & Kiefer, 1999). Experts automatically categorize objects of 
their expertise at the subordinate level, while novices by default categorize the 
same objects  at  the basic  level  (Tarr  & Gauthier,  2000).  Hence,  the larger 
N170 amplitudes for human faces than for other objects have been interpreted 
as a consequence of expertise in human face recognition because human faces 
are  categorized  by  default  at  the  subordinate  level.  Rossion,  Gauthier, 
Goffaux, Tarr, and Crommelinck (2002) examined the N170 response elicited 
by  novel  objects  (Greebles)  in  participants  trained  in  the  lab  to  expertly 
recognize the Greebles and untrained control participants. Human faces and 
Greebles elicited the N170 and the human face inversion effect (delayed and 
enhanced N170) was observed for both groups. However, an inversion effect 
for Greebles was found only in the Greeble experts. Rossion, Kung, and Tarr 
(2004) presented human faces together with Greebles or non-trained objects. 
Their  results revealed that,  for the lab-trained Greeble experts, there was a 
competition  effect  on  the  N170  when  human  faces  were  presented  with 
Greebles, but not when human faces were presented with non-trained objects. 
This result  indicates that both human faces and objects of expertise recruit 
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similar processes that are not shared with non-trained objects.
Unlike  the  P1  component,  the  N170  seems  to  be  less  sensitive  to 
attention.  For example,  Cauquil,  Edmonds and Taylor (2000) compared the 
N170 responses to four stimulus categories (full  human faces,  human eyes 
only,  human  faces  with  closed  eyes,  and  flowers)  in  two  tasks  where 
participants had to detect either eyes only or faces with eyes closed. The N170 
responses were not affected by whether or not the stimuli were targets. Carmel 
and Bentin (2002) presented four categories  of  stimuli  (human faces,  cars, 
furniture, and birds) to participants in two tasks (i.e., Animacy Decision and 
Car Monitoring). In the Animacy Decision Task, all stimuli were judged as 
animal or non-animal  and the N170 to human faces  was larger  than every 
other stimulus category. In the Car Monitoring Task, cars were the targets and 
the N170 response to human faces was larger than those to birds and furniture, 
but there was no significant N170 difference between human faces and cars. 
However,  cars did not  elicit  a  larger  N170 amplitude than furniture either, 
though cars did elicit larger a N170 than birds. The authors of both papers 
(Cauquil, Edmonds & Taylor, 2000; Carmel & Bentin, 2002) questioned the 
influence of attention on the N170. They argued that in the target detection 
task, targets should attract more attention than non-targets, so the absence of 
the N170 difference between targets and non-targets implies attention does not 
affect on the N170 to human faces. Moreover, Carmel and Betin (2002) argued 
that attention modulates the N170 response to other objects (e.g., cars), but not 
the response to human faces. 
However,  other researchers have reported effects  of attention on the 
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N170 to faces (Eimer, 2000a; Sreenivasan, Goldstein, Lustig, Rivas, & Jha, 
2009;  Mohamed,  Neumann,  & Schweinberger,  2009).  For  example,  Eimer 
(2000a) manipulated attention to human faces when they were presented either 
at the central or the peripheral visual field in a target detection task and found 
an effect of attention on the N170 only when faces were presented centrally. 
When human faces were superimposed on scenes (Sreenivasan et al., 2009) 
the attention effect  was observed only when human faces  were not  highly 
discriminable.  Finally,  Mohamed,  Neumann,  and  Schweinberger  (2009) 
argued that the N170 can be modulated by attention load. They replicated the 
N170 difference between human faces and houses in a low attention load task, 
but found that the N170 amplitude was reduced for human faces and enhanced 
for houses in a high attention load task.
Interestingly, the N170 can be larger when people expect to see human 
faces  rather  than  words,  even though  neither  faces  nor  words  are  actually 
presented. Wild and Busey (2004) embedded human faces or words in visual 
noise and compared the responses in high contrast, low contrast and noise only 
conditions. Human faces elicited a larger N170 in both high and low contrast 
conditions.  In  the  noise  only  condition,  the  N170  amplitude  was  larger  if 
participants  expected  to  see  human  faces  rather  than  words.  For  those 
participants who reported seeing faces or words in the noise only condition, 
the N170 amplitudes  were  larger  if  they reported seeing  faces  than  seeing 
words. These results support the notion that top-down processes modulate the 
N170.
To summarize, the N170 component is an occipito-temporal distributed 
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component that peaks around 170ms after stimulus onset. It is modulated by 
categorization level because human faces and other objects of expertise, which 
are categorized at the subordinate level by default,  elicit larger N170s than 
non-expertise objects (e.g., cars, flowers, furniture), which are categorized at 
the basic level by default. Moreover, it is sensitive to configural processing 
because stimulus inversion enhances N170 amplitude and delays its latency. 
Finally, it is less sensitive to attention, but not completely free from attentional 
influence.
1.2.3 P2
The P2 component follows the P1 and the N170 components. The P2 
literature is not as established as that for the P1 or the N170. In general, there 
are  anterior  and  posterior  P2  components  (Luck  &  Hillyard,  1994).  The 
anterior P2 has been related to working memory (e.g., Lefebvre, Marchand, 
Eskes, & Connolly, 2005), while the posterior P2 has been linked to semantic 
processing (e.g., Gruber & Muller, 2005).
The posterior P2 is sensitive to the semantic aspect of the stimuli. For 
example, using an N-back task, Rose, Chmid, Winzen, Sommer, and Büchel 
(2005) embedded task-relevant letters in background pictures with different 
degrees of degration. The posterior P2 amplitudes increased as the background 
pictures became more and more visible. Moreover, there was no significant 
difference in the posterior P2 between the 1-back and the 2-back tasks, which 
suggests that the posterior P2 is not very sensitive to working memory load.
Sensitivity  of  the  posterior  P2 to  semantic  information  can  also  be 
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observed in the semantic priming paradigm. For example, Rossell, Price and 
Nobre (2003) presented words or nonwords as primes and targets in a lexical 
decision task. The primes and the targets were either related or unrelated. For 
the related pairs, the words were exemplars of a given category. The stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA) was either 200ms or 1000ms. The posterior P2 was 
larger for related prime-target pairs than the unrelated pairs, but only when the 
SOA was 200ms.
For longer SOAs, semantic processing can be probed using a repetition 
priming paradigm. Gruber and Muller  (2005) presented a  sequence of line 
drawings that were either meaningful or meaningless. The SOAs ranged from 
2.7s to 3 s. Each drawing was displayed for 700ms and repeated 3 times non-
consecutively. The participant’s task was to judge the meaningfulness of the 
drawings. Results showed that at the first presentation, meaningless drawings 
elicited a larger P2 than meaningful ones. A reduction in P2 amplitude was 
observed  when  the  repetitions  were  compared  to  the  first  presentations. 
Interestingly, neither the P1 nor the N1 differed between the meaningful and 
the meaningless conditions. The P2 difference was not due to the low-level 
physical  differences  of  the  stimuli,  but  more  likely  reflecting  semantic 
processing.
The P2 responses to different attributes of a conceptual category may 
vary.  For  example,  Hoenig,  Sim,  Bochev,  Herrnberger,  and  Kiefer  (2008) 
required  participants  to  verify  visual  or  action-related  attributes  of  either 
natural or man-made object concepts. They found that the posterior P2 was 
larger for visual attribute verification of man-made object concepts, followed 
19
by action-related attribute verification of man-made object concepts.  Visual 
attribute verification of natural object concepts elicited the smallest posterior 
P2.  The  authors  argued  that  the  dominant  attributes  are  action-related 
attributes for man-made objects and visual attributes for natural objects (also 
see Kiefer, 2005). The results indicated that the P2 amplitudes were smaller 
for the dominant attributes of a concept category.
Therefore,  the  posterior  P2  is  sensitive  to  semantic  information  of 
visual stimuli, regardless of task relevance and working memory (Gruber & 
Muller, 2005; Rose et al., 2005). Processing the dominant attributes of concept 
elicits smaller P2 amplitudes than processing the nondominant ones (Hoenig et 
al., 2008).
The posterior P2 component can be affected by attention. For example, 
Luck and Hillyard (1994) reported two EEG experiments using visual search 
tasks. In Experiment 1, they presented four types of visual stimuli that each 
contained eight small colour bars. For one type of stimuli, all eight bars were 
small,  blue and vertical. In the other three types, one of the eight bars was 
different from the rest in colour (i.e., green), orientation (i.e., horizontal), or 
size (i.e. large). In different stimulus blocks, deviant bars of one dimension 
became the targets while those of the other dimensions remained non-targets. 
Participants were instructed to detect the target bars. Analysis of the posterior 
P2 component showed that visual stimuli with target bars elicited larger P2 
amplitudes than those without a target. Hence, the posterior P2 can be affected 
by attention. Moreover, the visual stimuli with a nontarget deviant and those 
without deviant bars did not show significant P2 difference. This suggests that 
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the  P2  effect  was  due  to  task-directed,  voluntary  attention,  instead  of  an 
automatic attention shift to the deviants. 
In Experiment 2, Luck and Hillyard (1994) further compared responses 
to  targets  that  were  either  deviant  bars  in  a  single  dimension  or  in  any 
dimension.  There  were again  four  types  of  visual  stimuli.  But  in  different 
conditions, participants responded to the stimuli 1) when one of the eight bars 
was  blue  (colour  deviant  condition);  2)  when  one  of  the  eight  bars  was 
horizontal (orientation deviant condition); 3) when one of the eight bars was 
larger; or 4) when one of the eight bars was different from the rest regardless 
of the dimension of the deviation. The proportion of the targets was the same 
across the four conditions. Results showed again that the P2 amplitudes were 
larger for the targets than for the non-targets. Furthermore, the P2 difference 
between targets and nontargets was larger when targets were deviant bars in 
any dimension (condition 4) than in a single dimension (any of the other three 
conditions). This suggests that when task relevant, an automatic attention shift 
can affect the P2 component.
An attention effect on the posterior P2 can be observed not only when 
attention is allocated to the stimulus, but also when attention is absent from the 
stimulus despite task relevance. Vogel and Luck (2002) presented sequences of 
20 stimuli where each stimulus was displayed for 33ms with a 50ms inter-
stimulus interval. Two targets, a digit and a letter “E”, were embedded in a 
sequence consisting of the other letters. The second target was either at the 3rd 
(inside attentional blink period) or the 7th  (outside attentional blink) position 
after  the first  target.  Moreover,  the second target  was either  in  the middle 
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(masked  by  the  following  nontargets)  or  at  the  end  (not  masked)  of  the 
sequence. It was found that the posterior P2 responses to the second target 
were suppressed when they fell  within  the attentional  blink.  This  occurred 
regardless  of  whether  the second target  was masked or not.  Therefore,  the 
posterior P2 not only increased when attention was directed to the stimulus (as 
in Luck & Hillyard, 1994), it also decreased when attention was absent from 
the stimulus (Vogel & Luck, 2002). The latter effect occurred even when the 
stimulus was task relevant.
Therefore,  the  posterior  P2  component  is  related  to  semantic 
processing.  Processing  different  attributes  of  a  concept  and  attention  can 
modulate  the  posterior  P2  amplitudes,  with  task  relevance  affecting  the 
attention effect.
1.3 Audio - Visual Processing
The multi-modal distribution of conceptual categorization in the brain 
was discussed briefly in Section 1.1, but the interaction between processing in 
different modalities requires further clarification. When the auditory stimulus 
is simple and the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the auditory and 
the visual stimuli is brief, attention can spread between the auditory and visual 
modalities. For example, Busse and colleagues (2005) instructed participants 
to attend to only one side of a computer screen and to respond whenever a 
checkerboard with dots appeared on the attended side, but not to respond to 
checkerboard  stimuli  presented  on  the  unattended  side.  Half  of  the 
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checkerboards  were  presented  simultaneously  with  a  task-irrelevant  tone. 
Overall, attention affected the P1 regardless of tone presentation. To examine 
the audiovisual interaction, the authors obtained two difference waves. They 
subtracted  the  visual-only  condition  ERP waveform  from  the  audiovisual 
condition  ERP waveform when the  checkerboard  appeared  in  the  attended 
hemi-field and they subtracted the visual-only condition ERP waveform from 
the audiovisual condition ERP waveform when the checkerboard appeared in 
the unattended hemi-field. Comparing the difference waves from the attended 
checkerboard  conditions  to  the  difference  waves  from  the  unattended 
checkerboard conditions, they found a negativity starting at 220ms after tone 
onset in the attended condition difference waveform, which they interpreted as 
indicating a spread of attention between the auditory and the visual modalities.
Donohue, Roberts, Grent-‘t-Jong, and Woldorff (2011) used a similar 
paradigm.  The  centrally  located  tones  in  the  audio-visual  conditions  were 
played with a SOA of 0ms (i.e., simultaneously), 100ms, or 300ms. Difference 
waveforms were created as described above for the Busse et al. (2005) study 
and  compared  for  the  three  SOA conditions.  There  was  negative-polarity 
activity  at  frontal  central  electrode  sites  starting  200ms  after  onset  of  the 
auditory stimulus in both the simultaneous presentation and the 100ms SOA 
condition. The findings indicate that spread of attention can occur from the 
visual modality to the auditory modality both when the auditory and the visual 
stimuli are presented simultaneously and when there is a brief SOA. Although 
attention spread was not observed when the SOA was 300ms, this does not 
necessarily  mean  that  there  is  no  cross-modality  effect  at  longer  SOAs. 
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Facilitation effects  from the visual  modality to  the auditory modality have 
been reported in priming studies (e.g., Noppeney, Josephs, Hocking, Price, & 
Friston, 2008; McKone & Dennis, 2000; Schneider, Engel, & Debener, 2008). 
Even with an SOA of 1400ms, auditory object recognition is faster and more 
accurate  when  the  category  of  the  preceding  visual  stimulus  is  congruent 
rather than incongruent with the category of the auditory stimulus (Schneider 
et. al., 2008).
When the SOA is longer, the brain may rely on an amodal mechanism 
to manage information from different modalities. In the Donohue et al. (2011) 
study, the scalp distributions of the negative-polarity difference waves 200 ms 
after auditory stimulus onset were not identical for the simultaneous and the 
100ms-delay conditions. The authors suggested that the sources contributing 
to the effect may differ between the simultaneous condition and the 100ms-
delay condition.  Separating  responses  to  the  left  and  the  right  side  of  the 
screen,  the  authors  found  that  the  early  negativity  in  the  simultaneous 
condition  was  biased  towards  the  hemisphere  contralateral  to  the  visual 
stimulus presentation hemi-field. Given that sounds were presented centrally, 
this suggests that within-modality processes were involved in the simultaneous 
condition, but when there was a delay between the auditory and the visual 
stimuli, attention spread relied on amodal processes.
The audiovisual  studies  described above focused on the  effect  of  a 
visual stimulus on an auditory stimulus. The influence of an auditory stimulus 
on  a  visual  stimulus  is  less  consistent.  For  example,  Greene,  Easton,  and 
LaShell (2001) failed to find a facilitation effect from the auditory modality to 
24
the  visual  modality,  whereas  Schneider  and  colleagues  (2008)  reported  a 
priming  effect  of  auditory  stimuli  on  visual  object  recognition.  The 
inconsistency may be due partially to the picture quality difference between 
the two studies. Schneider et al. (2008), presented degraded pictures. Hence, 
category congruency from the auditory modality could help with recognition 
of  the  visual  object.  Chen  and  Spence  (2011),  who  presented  an  auditory 
stimulus  followed  346ms  later  by  a  13ms  visual  stimulus  that  was  then 
masked, found a similar effect. Visual sensitivity was significantly increased 
when the category of the auditory stimulus was congruent with the category of 
the visual object. Together with the Schneider et al. (2008) study, these results 
suggest that an auditory effect on visual object recognition is more likely to be 
observed when visual recognition is difficult.
Moreover,  the  delay  of  visual  stimulus  presentation  in  both  studies 
(i.e., Schneider et al., 2008 and Chen & Spence, 2011) was necessary for the 
auditory effect to be observed. When the SOA between the auditory stimulus 
and the visual stimulus was shortened the facilitation effect vanished (Chen & 
Spence, 2011). This is due to the intrinsic difference in visual versus auditory 
object processing. Visual recognition of environmental objects occurs within 
150ms of stimulus onset (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996), but environmental 
sound  recognition  takes  longer  because  the  information  in  the  sounds  is 
revealed over time. A short or 0ms SOA does not provide enough time for 
extraction of auditory information that can benefit visual object recognition.
1.4 Categorization Level Manipulations
25
In  the  studies  by  Chen  and  Spence  (2011)  and  by  Schneider  and 
colleagues  (2008),  the  auditory  and  visual  stimulus  categories  could  be 
congruent or incongruent while the categorization levels were held constant at 
the basic level. The visual object recognition difficulty obtained by degrading 
the  visual  stimuli  was  also  at  the  basic  level  of  categorization.  Therefore, 
hearing a dog bark at the basic level should activate the representation of the 
basic-level concept dog. This representation includes features not only within 
the  auditory  modality,  but  also  in  the  visual  modality.  Given  spreading 
activation  of  representations  is  associative,  the  visual  representation  of  the 
basic-level concept dog is primed. Therefore, when the visual input of a dog is 
later received, recognition at the basic level becomes easier. It leaves open, 
however, the effect of the categorization level in cross-modality priming. Does 
the congruency between the categorization level of the auditory stimulus (and 
therefore, the activated concept) and the visual stimulus affect visual stimulus 
processing?
Repetition  priming  studies  where  categories  were  held  constant  but 
categorization levels were manipulated showed priming effect both within and 
across  categorization  levels  (Martinovic,  Gruber,  &  Müller,  2009;  Francis, 
Corral, Jones, & Saenz, 2008). Behavioural responses were facilitated for both 
priming within the superordinate level and priming within the basic level. For 
priming across categorization levels, Francis and colleagues (2008) observed a 
facilitation effect of priming across categorization levels in both directions. 
Martinovic and colleagues (2009) found a facilitation effect of superordinate-
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to-basic  level  priming.  The  priming  effect  was  stronger  for  within  than 
between categorization level priming. As additional perceptual information is 
needed for a more specific level of categorization (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991), 
more  feature  processing  regions  are  primed  after  a  concept  at  a  specific 
categorization  level  is  activated.  Processing  of  subsequent  visual  stimulus 
from  the  same  category  and  at  the  same  categorization  level  is  easier, 
compared to a more general categorization level. Martinovic and colleagues 
(2009) also reported a tendency that the P1 amplitudes were enhanced in the 
basic-level  categorization  compared  to  superordinate  categorization.  But 
whether  categorization  levels  affect  visual  processing  in  cross-modality 
priming remains unclear.
Based  on  the  evidence,  we  hypothesized that  both  category  and 
categorization level congruency should play a role in sensory processing of 
subsequent  visual  stimuli. As  categories  can  be  congruent  or  incongruent 
depending  on  categorization  levels,  basic  level  congruence  should  be 
particularly important because most objects are by default categorized at this 
level. Basic level categorization also has a balance between inclusiveness and 
specificity  of  feature  processing.  It  provides  a  good  starting  point  for 
investigating how specificity of categorization may affect visual processing. 
1.4.1 Present Experiments
The  current  study  examined  whether  the  level  of  conceptual 
categorization of an auditory stimulus affects the processing of a subsequently 
presented  visual  stimulus.  More  specifically,  we are  interested  in  effect  of 
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categorization levels on the P1 and the N170 components. The P1 component 
has  been  an  indicator  of  early  visual  processing.  The  N170  component  is 
related to configural processing, sensitive to face-like stimuli and changes as 
default categorization level shifts. We expected that conceptual representation 
activated  by auditory stimuli  would  affect  visual  sensory processing  given 
concepts  are  represented  as  multi-modal  distributed  pattern.  A subsequent 
visual  stimulus  that  is  congruent  with  the  activated  representation  may 
consequently  be  processed  more  efficiently  and  attract  more  sensory 
processing resources. Therefore, the P1 component should be affected by the 
categorization level of the auditory stimulus. We were also interested to see 
whether the N170 amplitudes increase when the preceding auditory stimulus 
could be categorized at a more specific level. The N170 component should 
have a larger amplitude when the visual stimulus is to be categorized at a more 
specific level of categorization. We used faces (dog faces or human faces) or 
face-like stimuli (the front view of a car) to ensure an N170 component was 
elicited. Given that conceptual categorization of an auditory stimulus requires 
time, we adopted a priming paradigm in which the auditory stimulus preceded 
the visual stimulus. In addition, across experiments the category congruency 
between the auditory and the visual stimuli was varied to determine whether 
categorization level and stimulus category interact to affect visual processing. 
In the first experiment (Dog-Dog experiment), we used dog barks as 
the auditory stimuli and novel dog faces as the visual stimuli. The auditory and 
the visual stimuli were congruent at the basic level (i.e., dog). By training our 
participants, we created two categorization level conditions for the auditory 
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stimuli.  Half  of  the  auditory  stimuli  were  untrained  and  were  therefore 
expected  to  be  categorized  at  the  basic  level  whereas  the  other  half  were 
trained  and  therefore  were  individually  identifiable  and  expected  to  be 
categorized at the subordinate level (i.e., associated with a dog whose name 
was known). Participants were not trained to recognize the dog faces. Thus, all 
the dog faces were assumed to be categorized at the basic level. 
In the second experiment (Dog-Car experiment), the training procedure 
for the auditory stimuli was the same as in the Dog-Dog experiment. However, 
auditory dog bark stimuli were followed by front views of cars as the visual 
stimuli.  The car  pictures  were all  novel  and therefore were assumed to be 
categorized at the basic level, like the dog faces. Hence, there was category 
incongruency between the barks and the cars.
In  the  third  experiment  (Dog-Human  experiment)  the  training 
procedure  for  the  auditory  stimuli  was  the  same  as  in  the  Dog-Dog 
experiment.  The  auditory  dog  bark  stimuli  were  followed  by human  face 
visual stimuli. Hence, the categories were different at the basic level, but the 
same at the superordinate level (i.e., animals). More importantly, unlike dog 
faces and cars, human faces are believed to be individually categorized (i.e., at 
the  subordinate  level).  Hence,  the  visual  stimuli  were  congruent  with  the 
trained auditory stimuli in categorization level as both could be individually 
categorized.
In  the  fourth  experiment  (Human-Dog  experiment),  the  auditory 
stimuli were human voices saying “dada”. As in Experiments 1-3, participants 
learned to associate a specific person’s name with the voice for half of the 
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auditory  stimuli.  The  auditory  stimuli  were  followed  by  novel  dog  faces. 
Hence, the categories of the auditory and the visual stimuli were different at 
the basic level, but the same at the superordinate level (i.e., animals), as in the 
Dog-Human  experiment.  Given  that  all  the  dog  faces  were  untrained  and 
categorized at  the basic level,  the dog faces were more congruent with the 
untrained voices than with the trained voices in terms of categorization level. 
Together,  the  third  and  the  fourth  experiments  (i.e.,  the  Dog-Human 
experiment and the Human-Dog experiment) examine whether categorization 
level congruency between the auditory and the visual stimulus affects visual 
stimulus processing.
In  the  fifth  experiment  (Human-Human  experiment),  the  auditory 
stimuli and the training were the same as in the Human-Dog experiment, but 
the visual stimuli were the human faces used in the Dog-Human experiment. 
Both voices and human faces belong to the same basic-level category, human. 
This is similar to the Dog-Dog experiment. However, while the dog faces and 
the untrained dog barks were both categorized at the basic level (i.e., category-
level congruent), the human faces were more congruent in categorization level 
with the trained voices than the untrained voices because both the human faces 
and the trained voices should be individually categorized.
The  sixth  and  final  experiment  (Dog-Mix  experiment)  was  slightly 
different from the previous five. In the first five experiments, the participants 
knew what basic level stimulus category would follow the auditory stimulus. 
For  example,  in  Experiment  3  after  hearing  a  dog  bark  the  participants 
expected to see a human face. Although they had never seen the individual 
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faces previously, they knew that it would be a human face. It is possible that in 
addition  to  activation  of  the  representation  of  the  auditory  stimulus,  the 
representation  of  the  visual  category  was  also  activated  before  seeing  the 
visual  stimulus.  The  last  experiment  reduced  this  expectation  by  adding 
uncertainty to the category of the visual stimuli. Dog barks were the auditory 
stimuli  and  the  same training  procedure  was  applied.  However,  the  visual 
stimuli following the dog barks could be dog faces, cars, or human faces, so 
the  category  congruency  between  the  visual  and  the  auditory  stimuli  was 
uncertain. The role of categorization levels in visual processing could then be 
explored without the basic-level category expectation effect.
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Chapter 2 General Method
2.1 Data Recording and Processing
The data acquisition was done using a Biosemi Active Two System. 
The EEG was recorded from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted to an elastic cap 
based on the extended 10-20 system. Two electrodes (EX1 and EX2) were 
placed above and below the left eye to measure eyeblinks. In the Dog-Dog 
experiment, another two electrodes (EX3 and EX4) were attached to the outer 
canthus of both eyes to measure horizontal eyemovements. In the other five 
experiments,  one electrode (EX4) was attached to  the outer  canthus of the 
right eye. The horizontal eyemovements can be observed by subtracting data 
of  the  EX4  from the  average  of  the  EX1  and  the  EX2.  In  addition,  one 
electrode (EX5) was placed on the nose tip. The EEG and EOG were recorded 
continuously  from 0Hz to  52Hz at  a  sampling  rate  of  256  Hz.  Data  was 
referenced  to  the  common  mode  sense  active  electrode  during  recording 
(Metting van Rijn, Peper, & Grimbergen, 1990).
The raw EEG data were imported using the nose as the reference. A 
low-pass  filter  of  30Hz  was  applied  before  a  high-pass  filter  of  0.1Hz. 
Artefacts introduced by muscle movements were removed through inspection. 
ICA was used to remove eye movements. The continuous data were epoched 
with a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline. Data were then re-referenced to average 
values from 64 channels on the scalp. 
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2.2 ERP Components
The processed  data  were  averaged across  epochs within  conditions, 
channels and participants. There are three ERPs elicited by the visual stimuli 
that are of interest: the P1, the N170, and the P2. The half area latency of each 
component was calculated for each participant by condition (Luck, 2005). We 
used a time window from 55-150ms for the visual P1, from 130-190ms for the 
N170, and 155-250ms for the P2. By definition, the half area latency for a 
given component is the time point where the area under the EEG waveform 
within the time window was divided in half.
The reported half-area latencies  were determined across  a  subset  of 
channels. The visual P1 component has a bi-lateral posterior distribution and 
studies of the visual P1 typically report effects in channels such as O1/O2, 
PO7/PO8, P7/P8, and PO3/PO4 (e.g., Sausung, et. al., 2005; Freunberger, et. 
al., 2008a, 2008b; Mangun, et. al., 2001). Here, six regions, comprising six 
channels each, were used for the statistical analyses of the P1 (left anterior: 
F3, F5, F7, FC3, FC5, and FT7; left middle: C3, C5, T7, CP3, CP5, and TP7;  
left posterior: P3, P5, P7, PO3, PO7, and O1; right anterior: F4, F6, F8, FC4,  
FC6,  and  FT8;  right  middle:  C4,  C6,  T8,  CP4,  CP6,  and  TP8;  and  right 
posterior: P4, P6, P8, PO4, PO8, and O2). Channels in the left posterior and 
right posterior regions were used for calculating the half area latencies. For the 
N170,  the  half-area  latencies  were  averaged  across  six  occipito-temporal 
channels (P7, P8, PO7, PO8, P9, and P10). These six channels are commonly 
used in N170 studies (see Rossion & Jacques, 2008 for review). The same six 
34
channels were used for the visual P2 half –area latency analysis.
The  mean  amplitudes  of  the  ERP components  were  defined  as  the 
averaged values within a 20ms time window surrounding the ERP peaks of the 
grand average waves. They were calculated using the following steps. First, 
data were averaged across participants, but within channels and conditions, to 
obtain the grand average waveforms. Then, the ERP peaks for these average 
waves were calculated and averaged across channels and conditions. Third, a 
20ms time-window was centered at the ERP peak mean. Fourth, the average 
amplitudes  within  this  time  window  were  determined  for  each  channel, 
condition, and participant. 
2.3 Statistical Analyses
For the analysis of the visual P1, there were three factors: Old/New 
condition (Old: the preceding barks/voices had been learned in training; New: 
the preceding barks/voices were new), Hemisphere (the left/right hemisphere) 
and AMP region (the anterior, the middle, and posterior regions). For the N170 
and the visual P2, three factors were used, including Old/New condition (Old: 
the preceding barks/voices had been learned in training; New: the preceding 
barks/voices  were  new),  Hemisphere  (the  left/right  occipito-temporal  area) 
and Channel Group (P9/P10; P7/P8; PO7/PO8).
2.4 Stimuli
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The auditory stimuli (16 bit mono, 44.1 kHz sampling rate, 10 ms fade-
in and fade-out) were sixty audio recordings of barks from 60 dogs or voices 
from 30 males and 30 females. The barks were taken from the online sound 
databases,  such  as  Freesound  (www.freesound.org)  and  Findsounds 
(www.findsounds.com). The voices were recorded by the experimenters in our 
recording booth. The speakers were thirty male and thirty female Singaporean 
Chinese  undergraduates  from  the  National  University  of  Singapore.  Each 
speaker  was  paid  2  SGD  for  the  recording.  None  of  the  speakers  was  a 
participant in any of the six EEG experiments.
The visual stimuli (690x397 pixels, 72 dpi, grayscale) were sixty face 
pictures of 60 dogs, sixty front-views of 60 cars, and/or sixty faces pictures of 
60 Chinese (30 males and 30 females). The dog faces and the front-views of 
cars  were  taken  from  the  internet  (e.g.,  dog  faces  from 
http://www.dailypuppy.com/).  The  human  faces  were  taken  from  the  face 
database  created  by  W.  G.  Hayward  in  the  Visual  Cognition  Lab  at  the 
University of Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 3 Dog-Dog Experiment
3.1 Methods
Each participant came to the lab on two consecutive days. On Day 1, 
participants learned to identify each of 30 dog barks with a unique dog name 
(See Figure 1). The 30 dog barks were divided into four groups, with seven or 
eight barks per group. Participants listened to each bark while the dog name 
was presented on the screen. At the end of each group of barks, there was a 
multiple-choice  test  to  ensure  that  participants  could  remember  the  name 
associated with each bark. Participants were encouraged to repeat the training 
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Figure 1: Procedure, the Dog-Dog experiment
Figure 3.1: Procedure. On Day 1, participants learned to associate each of 30 
different dog barks with a unique dog name. On Day 2, all participants were 
tested for recognition of the individual dog barks. If bark recognition accuracy 
was 80% or greater, they proceeded to the EEG experiment. In the EEG 
experiment, participants saw a sequence of 60 photographs of upright dog 
faces. Each dog face was preceded by either a dog bark for which  the 
participant had learned a name (old bark, 50%) or a new bark (50%). In 
addition, 6 inverted dog faces, also preceded by a bark, were presented. The 
participant’s task was to detect and respond to the inverted dog faces. Upright 
faces did not require a response.
session if more than one bark in the group was misnamed. After learning all 
barks, participants were given an identification test in which they listened to 
the barks presented in random order and they were required to type in the 
name corresponding to each bark. On Day 2, participants learned the barks and 
the names again. At the end of the revision, they were given the identification 
test again. Participants proceeded to the EEG experiment only if they correctly 
identified at least 80% of the barks.
In the EEG experiment, participants performed a target detection task 
in  which  they  heard  a  sequence  of  dog  barks  presented  centrally  and  in 
random  order,  each  of  which  was  followed  by  a  picture  of  a  dog  face, 
presented for 1017ms. Half of the barks had been learned in the training phase 
and the other half were new. The interval between the offset of the bark and 
the onset of the dog face was 217ms. The interval between the offset of the 
dog  face  and  the  onset  of  the  next  bark  was  817ms.  Each  dog  face  was 
presented once only. The participant's task was to press a key whenever an 
inverted dog face was presented. Upright dog faces did not require a response. 
There were 60 upright dog faces and 6 inverted ones in total. Bark assignment 
to old and new conditions and assignment of dog faces to follow an old or new 
bark was counterbalanced across participants.
Twenty-eight  participants  (14  females,  average  age  of  22)  from the 
National University of Singapore were included in the experiment. Informed 
written  consent  was obtained from each participant  before  the  experiment. 




The average hit rate was 94.05%, the average reaction time was 503ms, and 
the average false alarm rate was 0.48%. As the number of target trials was too 
small, no further analyses were conducted on the behavioral data.
3.2.2 P1
For the  P1 half  area  latency,  the  main  effect  of  Old/New condition 
(F(1, 27) = 1.27, p = .27) and the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 54) = 1.36, p = .27), 
Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 27) = 0.41,  p = .53), and Old/New x AMP x 
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Figure 2: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, Dog-Dog experiment
Figure 3.2:  Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the Old and the New conditions at the P1 latency in the Dog-Dog experiment. 
The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window surrounding 
the P1 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were subtracted 
by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The  amplitudes  were 
significantly different over the right hemisphere. The grey dots indicate the 
location of the 64 electrodes. The contour shows the significant area.
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Figure 3: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, Dog-Dog experiment
Figure 3.3: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  N170  latency  in  the  Dog-Dog 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the N170 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition 
were  subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The 
amplitudes  were  not  significantly  different  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 4: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, Dog-Dog experiment
Figure 3.4: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the Old and the New conditions at the P2 latency in the Dog-Dog experiment. 
The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window surrounding 
the P2 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were subtracted 
by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition.  The amplitudes were not 
significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The grey dots 
indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Hemisphere (F(2, 54) = 0.13, p = .88) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 
in the left and right posterior regions (see General Method) was 113ms. As 
noted in the Methods section, the grand average peak latency was used as the 
center of the 20ms time window used for analyzing the mean P1 amplitudes 
obtained from individual participants. The main effect of Old/New condition 
(F(1, 27) = 1.77, p = .19) was not significant, but the Old/New x Hemisphere 
interaction was significant (F(1, 27) = 6.00,  p = .02). A follow-up analysis 
revealed  that  for  right  hemisphere  electrodes  the  P1  amplitude  was 
significantly larger in the Old condition than in the New condition (F(1, 27) = 
7.21, p = .01), whereas for left hemisphere electrodes there was no such effect 
(F(1, 27) = 2.75, p = .11). There was no significant Old/New x AMP (F(2, 54) 
= 0.15, p = .86) or Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere (F(2, 54) = 0.07, p = .93) 
interaction.
3.2.3 N170
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 27) = 
0.79,  p =  .38) and the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 27) = 1.31,  p = .26), 
Old/New  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  1.46,  p =  .24),  and  Old/New  x 
Hemisphere x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.35, p = .71) interactions were not 
significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms at the six occipito-temporal electrodes (see General Method) was 
159ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
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surrounding this N170 peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 27) 
= 0.72, p = .40), the Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.28, p = .76), and 
Old/New  x  Hemisphere  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  0.26,  p =  .78) 
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Figure 5: ERPs, Dog-Dog experiment
Figure 3.5: The ERP responses to dog faces in the Dog-Dog experiment. The 
red dotted lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black solid lines show 
the ERP in the New condition. The light grey bars indicate the time windows 
for computing the average P1 amplitues.
interactions were not significant. However, the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 
27)  =  8.39,  p  =  .01)  interaction  was  significant.  Over  the  right  occipito-
temporal area, the N170 in the Old condition was marginally smaller than that 
in the New condition (F(1, 27) = 3.31,  p = .08), whereas there was no such 
effect over the left occipito-temporal area (F(1, 27) = 0.40, p = .53). 
3.2.4 P2
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 27) = 
2.39, p = .13), the  Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 27) = 0.12, p = .73), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.91,  p = .41), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.95, p = .39) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
at  the  six  occipito-temporal  electrodes  (see  General  Method)  was  220ms. 
Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window surrounding 
this peak indicated that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 27) = 0.54, p = .47), 
the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 27) = 3.65,  p = .07), Old/New x Channel 
Group (F(2,  54)  = 0.11,  p =  .90),  and Old/New x Hemisphere  x  Channel 
Group (F(2, 54) = 0.17, p = .84) interactions were not significant.
3.3 Discussion
The  Dog-Dog  experiment  compared  responses  to  the  dog  faces 
preceded by individually identifiable barks (i.e., the old condition) with those 
preceded  by  new  barks  (i.e.,  the  new  condition).  The  P1  amplitude  was 
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significantly  larger  following  Old  than  New  barks.  It  indicated  that  the 
preceding barks did affect the early processing stage of subsequent dog faces 
which share the same basic-level category with the barks. It suggested that 
categorization levels of concepts that  were activated by preceding auditory 
stimuli  can  affect  early  visual  processing  stage  of  subsequent  stimuli. 
However, the scalp distribution of the difference waveform varied from the 
expected P1 distribution. Instead of having an occipito-temporal distribution, 
the response difference spread over the temporal  region and only occurred 
over  the  right  hemisphere.  On  one  hand,  the  P1  component  is  subject  to 
attention modulation (e.g., Taylor, 2002; Klimesch, 2011). The P1 amplitude 
was larger for attended visual stimuli compared to the unattended ones. It is  
possible that the old barks brought more attention to the following dog faces, 
and hence increased the P1 amplitude. On the other hand, differences in scalp 
distribution might reflect the audiovisual interaction between barks and faces 
(Molholm et al., 2002). Molholm and colleagues (2002) compared responses 
to visual-only and auditory-only stimuli with responses to audiovisual stimuli. 
They found a multi-modal interaction in various time windows from 46ms up 
to 200ms after stimulus onset. For example, the earliest audiovisual interaction 
they  found  started  46ms  after  stimulus  onset  with  a  parieto-occipital 
distribution.  They  also  found  a  frontal-distributed  audiovisual  interaction 
around  100ms.  In  both  time  windows,  audiovisual  stimuli  elicited  more 
positive  responses  than  the  sum  of  the  visual-only  and  the  auditory-only 
responses. Our results may reflect both the auditory stimulus and the visual 
stimulus from the same basic-level category forming a unitary representation 
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by further processing the visual stimulus at a less-specific categorization level. 
The authors also linked this right lateral positivity to the attentional orienting 
systems,  suggesting  the  functional  significance  of  attention  in  audiovisual 
stimulus processing. Therefore, the response difference between the old and 
the new conditions might reflect modulation of the categorization levels of the 
preceding barks on early processing of the dog faces.
There was a marginally significant  effect  of  the barks on the N170 
amplitude. The N170 following the old barks tended to be smaller than the 
N170 following the new barks. However, the scalp distribution of the effect 
was similar to the effect in the P1 time window, which was different from the 
typical  N170  scalp  distribution.  The  difference  occurred  over  the  right 
hemisphere covering the frontal, the temporal and the occipital regions. The 
difference was also in the same direction as the effect in the P1 time window. 
Similar positivities were observed in a study by Molholm et al. (2002) who 
found that from 160ms to 180ms, responses to the audiovisual stimuli were 
less negative than the sum of responses to the audio-only and the visual-only 
stimuli, with a right occipito-temporal scalp distribution. The N170 is related 
to configural processing of visual stimuli. The N170 differences between the 
dog faces following the old barks and the new barks suggests the modulation 
of the categorization levels of the preceding barks on the configural processing 
of the dog faces.
There was no significant P2 difference between the faces following the 
old barks and the new barks. The posterior P2 component has been linked to 
semantic  processing.  Visual  stimuli  elicited  larger  P2  when  preceded  by 
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related versus unrelated stimuli  (Rossell  et  al.,  2003;  Federmeier  & Kutas, 
2002).  By  changing  the  categorization  level  of  the  barks,  we  potentially 
altered the categorical relatedness between the barks and the dog faces. For 
example,  both  the  barks  and the  dog faces  belong to  the  same basic-level 
category – Dog, but they might not be from the same dog (i.e., categorically 
unrelated). The new barks and the dog faces were categorically related, while 
the old barks and the dog faces might be categorically unrelated. Therefore, it 
appears that the P2 should be larger for the dog faces following the new barks 
than  the  old  barks.  However,  the  SOA between the  two stimuli  may have 
constrained the effect of categorical relatedness. Earlier studies revealed an 
effect  of  categorical  relatedness  for  both  200ms (Rossell  et  al.,  2003)  and 
500ms (Federmeier & Kutas, 2002) SOAs, it was not observed for 1000ms 
SOA (Rossell  et  al.,  2003). The minimum SOA between the barks and the 
faces  was  617ms,  which  might  be too  long for  the  categorical  relatedness 
effect to occur. 
The posterior P2 component can also be affected by attention, but only 
when  it  is  task  relevant.  As  observed  in  the  P1  time  window,  attention 
increased on the dog faces following the old barks. The current task was to 
detect the inverted dog faces and neither the dog barks nor the relationship 
between the barks and the dog faces were task relevant, so the P2 component 
was not affected by the preceding barks.
The  early  effects  in  this  experiment  raise  the  question  of  the 
circumstances under which familiar sounds modulate visual processing. Both 
barks and dog faces belong to the same basic-level category, Dog. Even for a 
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non-expert, a given stimulus pair might be recognized as from the same dog, 
which is a more specific category than the basic level one. If the effect were 
due  to  object  binding,  then  pairing  the  barks  with  visual  stimuli  from  a 
different basic-level category should eliminate it. In Experiment 2, we used 
front views of cars as the visual stimuli. Not only are cars from a different 
basic-level  category,  but  they are  also  from a  different  superordinate-level 
category,  Vehicle.  Thus,  the  auditory and  the  visual  stimuli  should  not  be 
recognized as from the same object.
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Chapter 4 Dog-Car Experiment
4.1 Methods
The Dog-Car experiment was the same as the Dog-Dog experiment, 
with the exception that in the visual target detection task the pictures were 
front views of cars.  There were 60 upright  car pictures and 6 inverted car 
pictures in total.
Twenty participants (12 females, mean age of 22.9) from the National 
University of Singapore were included in the experiment.  Informed written 
consent was obtained from each participant before the experiment. They were 
reimbursed at a rate of 9 SGD an hour for their time.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Behavioral Results
The average hit rate was 100%. The average reaction time was 528ms, 
and the average false alarm rate was 0.33%. As the number of the target trials 
was too small, no further analysis was conducted on the behavioral data.
4.2.2 P1
For the P1 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (Old: 111ms; 
New: 108ms;  F(1, 19) = 4.87,  p = .04) was significant, but the Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 19) = 0.04, p = .84) and Old/New x AMP (F(2, 38) = 0.05, p 
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= .95) interactions were not.  Although the Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
interaction (F(2,38) = 4.19,  p = .02) was also significant, follow-up analyses 
did not reveal any significant effects that included the Old/New factor.
 The peak latency of the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 
in the two occipito-temporal regions was 119ms. The analysis of the mean 
amplitudes within the 20ms time window surrounding this peak revealed that 
the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 19) = 1.18, p = .29), the Old/New x AMP 
(F(2, 38) = 0.27, p = .76), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere (F(2, 38) = 
0.04,  p  =  .96)  interactions  were  not  significant.  However,  the  Old/New x 
Hemisphere interaction was significant (F(1, 19) = 4.81, p = .04). For right 
hemisphere electrodes, the P1 amplitude in the New condition was marginally 
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Figure 6: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, Dog-Car experiment
Figure 4.1: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the Old and the New conditions at the P1 latency in the Dog-Car experiment.  
The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window surrounding 
the P1 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were subtracted 
by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The  amplitudes  were 
significantly different  over  the  left  hemisphere.  The grey dots  indicate  the 
location of the 64 electrodes. The contour indicates the significant area.
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Figure 7: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, Dog-Car experiment
Figure 4.2: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  N170  latency  in  the  Dog-Car 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the N170 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition 
were  subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The 
amplitudes  were  not  significantly  different  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes. 
Figure 8: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, Dog-Car experiment
Figure 4.3: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the Old and the New conditions at the P2 latency in the Dog-Car experiment.  
The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window surrounding 
the P2 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were subtracted 
by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition.  The amplitudes were not 
significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The grey dots 
indicate the location of the 64 electrodes. 
larger than that in the Old condition (F(1, 19) = 4.07, p = .06), whereas for left 
hemisphere  electrodes  the  P1  amplitude  in  the  New  condition  was 
significantly larger than that in the Old condition (F(1, 19) = 4.63, p = .04). 
4.2.3 N170
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 19) = 
0.17, p = .69), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 19) = 2.08, p = .17), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 38) = 0.35,  p = .71), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group F(2, 38) = 0.87, p = .43) interactions were not significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 168ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms 
time  window surrounding this  N170 peak revealed  that  the  main  effect  of 
Old/New (F(1, 19) = 0.44,  p = .51), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 19) = 
0.42,  p = .52),  Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 38) = 1.17,  p = .32), and 
Old/New  x  Hemisphere  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  38)  =  1.18,  p =  .32) 
interactions were not significant.
4.2.4 P2
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 19) = 
0.01, p = .92), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 19) = 0.56, p = .46), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 38) = 1.68,  p = .20), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 38) = 1.77, p = .18) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was 228ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
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surrounding the peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 19) = 
0.17, p = .68), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 19) = 1.05, p = .32), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 38) = 1.49,  p = .24), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 38) = 0.08, p = .92) interactions were not significant. 
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Figure 9: ERPs, Dog-Car experiment
Figure 4.4: The ERP responses to cars in the Dog-Car experiment. The red 
dotted lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black solid lines show the 
ERP in  the  New  condition.  The  grey  bars  indicate  the  time  windows  to 
compute the average P1 amplitudes.
4.3 Discussion
The Dog-Car experiment presented front views of cars following either 
individually identifiable barks (the old condition) or unknown barks (the new 
condition). The P1 amplitude elicited by car stimuli following old dog barks 
was significantly smaller than that elicited by car stimuli following new barks, 
particularly over the left hemisphere. This was opposite to the results at the P1 
time window in the Dog-Dog experiment, in which responses in the P1 time 
window  were  more  positive  over  the  right  hemisphere  to  the  dog  faces 
following the old barks than to those following the new barks. If the effects in 
the Dog-Dog experiment reflect binding of the visual and the auditory stimuli 
from the same basic-level category, the barks and the cars are not from the 
same basic-level category. However, the categorization level of the New barks 
were congruent with the cars. It was consistent with the hypothesis that the 
conceptual representation activated by the auditory stimulus can affect early 
visual processing of the subsequent stimulus. 
As P1 amplitude is  related  to  attention  (e.g.,  Mangun et.  al.,  2001; 
Taylor, 2002; Klimesch, 2011), it is also possible that preceding the cars with 
individually identifiable  barks  decreased attention to  the car  stimuli.  These 
findings are consistent with previous research that demonstrated the interplay 
between attention and cross-modal integration (see Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-
Faraco,  &  Woldorff,  2010  for  review).  Although  attention  is  not  always 
necessary for cross-modal integration, when semantic processing is involved, 
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such as detecting semantic congruency, attention to the sensory input from at 
least  one of the modalities  of the multimodal  stimulus is  required (van de 
Burg, Brederoo, Nieuwenstein, Theeuwes, & Olivers 2010). Moreover, multi-
modal  stimuli  can  capture  attention  and lead  to  spread of  attention  across 
modalities (Busse et al., 2005). Semantic congruency can facilitate processing 
of audiovisual stimuli, as reflected in faster reaction times and higher accuracy 
(e.g., Calvert, 2005; Laurienti,  Kraft, Maldjian, Burdette, &  Wallace, 2004; 
Calvert  & Thesen, 2004), and affect attention to stimuli that briefly follow 
(van de Burg  et  al.,  2010).  Attention  and cross-modal  integration  are  thus 
closely  related.  Here,  we  paired  stimuli  that  were  at  the  basic  level  of 
categorization,  but  were  from  different  conceptual  categories.  Half  of  the 
auditory stimuli were associated with individual dog names and were therefore 
more informative than the new barks. When these known barks were paired 
with unknown cars, they modulated attention to the car stimuli.
Taken together,  the Dog-Dog and the Dog-Car experiments  indicate 
that individually identifiable sounds can modulate responses to visual stimuli 
that  follow  shortly  thereafter.  The  Dog-Dog  experiment  showed  that 
individually  identifiable  auditory  stimuli  affect  responses  to  visual  stimuli 
when both the auditory and the visual stimuli are from the same basic-level 
category.  The Dog-Car experiment showed that  auditory stimuli  also affect 
responses to visual stimuli when the visual stimuli belong to a different basic-
level category. But the results from the two experiments were opposite both in 
the direction of amplitude changes and the scalp distributions.  Moreover, both 
dogs and cars have default categorization at the basic level. This raises the 
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question of whether the effect of auditory stimuli would still be present if the 
default level of the visual stimuli is at the subordinate level.
We can use human faces to address this question because most people 
categorize human faces at the subordinate level (Tanaka, 2001). Using human 
faces  has  another  two  advantages.  First,  the  N170  is  related  to  the 
categorization level of visual stimuli in that categorization at a more specific 
level elicits  a larger N170 amplitude (Tanaka & Curran,  2001).  Hence,  the 
absence of a significant effect on the N170 in Experiments 1 and 2 may mean 
that the preceding sounds did not change the categorization level of the dog 
and car stimuli. However, we need to exclude the possibility that the N170 
responses to objects of no expertise, such as dog and car images, are too small 
to reveal a detectable modulation of the N170 response by a preceding known 
auditory stimulus (i.e., a bark). The N170 component has a larger amplitude 
for human faces than for other objects (e.g., Eimer, 2000b), and some authors 
have argued that it is face specific (see Earp & Everett, 2013 for a review). 
Therefore, using human faces allows us to test this explanation.
The  second  advantage  lies  in  the  categorization-level  congruency 
between human faces and individually identifiable barks. Although the first 
two experiments showed significant modulation of the preceding sounds on 
the  visual  responses,  the  details  of  this  modulation  demand  further 
investigation.  For  example,  the  Dog-Car  experiment  showed  that  the 
preceding sounds can affect attention to cars, but did not explain why attention 
to cars decreased. Given the close relationship between attention and semantic 
congruency, one possible explanation is that the effect on attention may not 
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rely solely on the categorization level  of  the auditory stimuli.  Congruency 
between the categorization levels of the auditory and the visual stimuli may 
also play a role. Cars have a default categorization at the basic level, as do the 
unknown dog barks. Hence, cars are more congruent with the unknown barks 
than  with  the  individually  identifiable  barks  and  this  might  allow  cars 
following  the  unknown  barks  to  attract  more  attention.  If  the  hypothesis 
stands, using human faces as the visual stimuli should give the opposite result.  
That  is,  a  human  face  should  attract  more  attention  when  following  an 
individually identifiable bark because both stimuli are at the subordinate level.
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Chapter 5 Dog-Human Experiment
5.1 Methods
The  Dog-Human  experiment  was  the  same  as  the  Dog-Dog 
experiment, with the exception that the pictures in the visual target detection 
task were male and female Chinese faces. There were 60 upright Chinese faces 
and 6 inverted ones in total. Sixteen participants (8 females, mean age of 22.1) 
from the National University of Singapore were included in the experiment. 
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Figure 10: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, Dog-Human experiment
Figure 5.1: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  P1  latency  in  the  Dog-Human 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P1 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  There  was 
significant  interaction  between  the  Old/New  conditions  and  the 
Anterior/Middle/Posterior regions. The human faces following the new barks 
elicited larger amplitudes than the human faces following the old barks over 
the  anterior  regions.  There  was  no  significant  difference  over  the  middle 
regions. The human faces following the new barks elicited smaller amplitudes 
than the human faces following the old barks over the posterior regions. The 
grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes. The contours indicate the 
significant areas.
The participants were ethnically Chinese, so the pictures were own-race faces. 
Informed  written  consent  was  obtained  from  each  participant  before  the 
experiment. They were reimbursed at a rate of 9 SGD an hour for their time.  
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Behavioral Results
The average hit rate was 100%. The average reaction time was 487ms. 
The average false alarm rate was 0.31%. As the number of the target trials was 
too small, no further analysis was done on the behavioral data.
5.2.2 P1
For the P1 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
0.03,  p = .86), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 30) = 0.17,  p = .84), Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.49, p = .50), and the Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 30) = 0.06, p = .94) interactions were not significant. The peak latency of 
the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 114ms. The analysis of the 
mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window surrounding this peak revealed 
that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 1.22,  p = .29), the Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.00,  p = .95), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2,  30)  =  2.12,  p =  .14)  interactions  were  not  significant.  However,  the 
Old/New x AMP interaction was significant (F(2,  30) = 5.10,  p = .01). At 
anterior  electrode  sites,  the  human  faces  following  the  new barks  elicited 
larger P1 amplitudes than the human faces following the old barks (F(1, 15) = 
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Figure 11: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, Dog-Human experiment
Figure 5.2: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  N170  latency  in  the  Dog-Human 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the N170 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition 
were  subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The 
amplitudes  were  not  significantly  different  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 12: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, Dog-Human experiment
Figure 5.3: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  P2  latency  in  the  Dog-Human 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P2 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. The amplitudes 
were not significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The 
grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
5.22,  p = .04). At middle electrode sites, there was no significant effect of 
Old/New condition (F(1, 15) = 0.03, p = .87). At posterior electrode sites, the 
human faces  following the  new barks  elicited  smaller  amplitudes  than  the 
human faces following the old barks (F(1, 15) = 4.94, p = .04). 
5.2.3 N170
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
0.00,  p = .95), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 1.72,  p = .21), and 
Old/New  x  Hemisphere  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  30)  =  0.83,  p =  .45) 
interactions  were  not  significant.  Although the  Old/New x Channel  Group 
interaction was significant (F(2, 30) = 3.62, p = .04), follow-up analyses failed 
to reveal a significant effect of Old/New for any Channel Group (P9/P10: F(1, 
15) = 2.16, p = .16; P8/P7: F(1, 15) = 0.70, p = .42; PO8/PO7: F(1, 15) = 1.68, 
p = .21). 
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 150ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms 
time window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New 
(F(1, 15) = 0.00, p = .96), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.50, p = .
49), Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 1.70,  p = .20), and Old/New x 
Hemisphere x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.24, p = .79) interactions were not 
significant.
5.2.4 P2
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
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1.69, p = .76), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.09, p = .76), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 2.92,  p = .07), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.19, p = .83) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
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Figure 13: ERPs, Dog-Human experiment
Figure 5.4: The ERP responses to human faces in the Dog-Human experiment. 
The red dotted lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black solid lines 
show the ERP in the New condition. The grey bars indicate the time windows 
to compute the average P1 amplitudes.
was 227ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
surrounding this peak indicated that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
0.39, p = .54), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.02, p = .88), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 1.02,  p = .37), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 1.00, p = .38) interactions were not significant.
5.3 Discussion
As in the Dog-Dog and the Dog-Car experiments, the barks preceding 
the human faces modulated the P1 response to the faces. However, unlike in 
the  Dog-Car  experiment,  but  similar  to  the  Dog-Dog  experiment,  the  P1 
amplitudes over posterior electrode sites were larger in the old condition than 
in the new condition. Taken together, these results suggest that the preceding 
sounds alone did not determine the direction of the P1 amplitude change to the 
visual stimulus.  Rather,  the category congruency between the bark and the 
subsequent  visual  stimulus  may  also  be  important.  Cars,  by  default,  are 
categorized  at  the  basic  level,  whereas  human  faces,  by  default,  are 
categorized  at  the  subordinate  level.  Hence,  in  the  Car  experiment  the  car 
stimuli were categorically congruent with the unknown barks, whereas in the 
Human  experiment  the  face  stimuli  were  categorically  congruent  with  the 
individually-identifiable barks. In both experiments, the P1 amplitudes were 
larger in the condition for which the categorization levels of the auditory and 
the visual stimuli were congruent. That is to say, cars in the new condition 
elicited larger P1 amplitudes than those in the old condition,  while  human 
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faces in the old condition elicited larger P1 amplitudes than those in the new 
condition. This suggests that it is the categorization-level congruency, or lack 
thereof,  between  the  auditory  and  the  visual  stimuli  that  determines  the 
direction  of  the  effect  on  the  P1  amplitude  between  the  old  and  the  new 
conditions.
There was a significant frontal difference between the Old and the New 
conditions in the P1 time window. The responses to the human faces following 
the  old  barks  versus  the  new barks  were  more  negative.  This  may reflect 
modulation of the anterior subcomponent of the visual N1 (Vogel & Luck, 
2000) during the P1 time window. The visual  N1 can be divided into two 
subcomponents with different latencies and scalp distributions. The anterior 
visual  N1 occupied  the  frontal  region and peaks  around 100ms,  while  the 
posterior  visual  N1 distributed  over  the  occipito  regions  and peaks  around 
160ms  (Vogel  & Luck,  2000).  The  anterior  visual  N1  can  be  affected  by 
attention (Talsma et al., 2010). Attention increases the anterior N1 amplitudes. 
Particularly,  Talma and colleagues (2009) observed that the attention effect 
increased when the auditory and the visual stimuli were not at the optimal 
SOA for  audiovisual  integration  (e.g.,  SOA longer  than  50ms).  Moreover, 
Töllner, Gramann, Müller, and Eimer (2008) reported that the anterior visual 
N1  was  related  to  modality  shifting.  Shifting  modality  enhanced  the  N1 
amplitudes.  Thus,  the  increase  negativity  over  the  anterior  region  for  the 
human faces following the old barks may reflect enhanced attention for better 
audiovisual integration.
By using human faces as the visual stimuli, the experiment also permits 
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elimination of a possible account of the lack of an Old/New effect on the N170 
in the first two experiments. There was no significant effect on the N170 in the 
Dog-Human experiment, suggesting that the categorization level of the human 
faces was not affected. As human faces typically elicit larger N170 amplitudes 
than other objects, the absence of an effect of the preceding sounds would not 
be due to the small amplitude of the N170. Instead, it is more likely that the 
N170 is not sensitive to the modulation by the preceding sounds. Preceding 
visual stimuli with individually identifiable sounds cannot immediately alter 
the categorization level of the visual stimuli. Note that the visual stimuli in all 
three experiments were presented only once and the participants' task was to 
indicate whether the visual stimuli were inverted, which required only basic-
level  categorization.  Modulation  of  the  N170  may  require  presenting  the 
audiovisual pairs repeatedly (e.g., Heisz, Watter, & Shedden, 2006).
Experiments 1 to 3 used barks as the auditory stimuli, but there is no 
reason to believe that barks are unique in causing the effects on the responses 
to  visual  stimuli.  We  argued  above  that  associating  auditory  stimuli  with 
names, which allows them to be individually identified, modulates responses 
to visual stimuli that follow shortly thereafter. Specifically, when the auditory 
and the visual stimuli belong to different basic-level categories (as in the Dog-
Car  and  the  Dog-Human  experiments),  categorization-level  congruency 
between the auditory and the visual stimuli will increase allocation of attention 
to the visual stimuli. Auditory stimuli from other categories should have the 
same effect on the visual responses, so in the fourth experiment we replaced 
the barks with human voices.
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Human  voices  were  chosen  because  compared  to  barks,  unknown 
human voices, by default, are categorized at a more specific level (Guastavino, 
2007; Belin, Fecteau, & Bédard, 2004). If the P1 effects are due to congruency 
between  stimulus  categorization  levels,  then  changing  the  default 
categorization level of the auditory stimulus to the subordinate level should 
also modulate the P1 effect. Voices in the old condition would still be more 
specific  than  the  unknown  voices,  as  the  former  could  be  individually 
identified  following  association  with  human  names.  Voices  in  the  new 
condition would still be more congruent in categorization level with dog faces 
than those in the old condition. Therefore, the dog faces in the new condition 
should attract more attention than the dog faces in the old condition and the P1 
in the new condition should be larger than that in the old condition.
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Chapter 6 Human-Dog Experiment
6.1 Methods
The Human-Dog experiment was the same as the Dog-Dog experiment 
with  the  exception  that  the  sounds  were  human  voices,  recorded  from 60 
Chinese students. There were 30 male voices and 30 female voices. All of the 
speakers said “dada”. The names the participants learned to associate with the 
voices  were  human  names  that  matched  the  sex  of  the  voice.  Sixteen 
participants (8 females,  mean age of 22.2) from the National University of 
Singapore were included in the experiment. The participants were ethnically 
Chinese, so the voices were own-race voices. Informed written consent was 
obtained from each participant before the experiment. They were reimbursed 
at a rate of 9 SGD an hour for their time.  
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Behavioral Results
The average hit rate was 100%. The average reaction time was 498ms, 
and the average false alarm rate was 0.73%. As the number of the target trials 
was too small, no further analysis was conducted on the behavioral data.
6.2.2 P1
For the P1 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
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3.07,  p = .10), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 30) = 0.38,  p = .69), Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 3.46,  p = .08), and tOld/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 30) = 0.88, p = .43) interactions were not significant.
The P1 peak latency derived from the grand average waveforms was 
119ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
surrounding  this  peak  revealed  a  marginally  significant  main  effect  of 
Old/New (F(1, 15) = 4.01, p = .06). The Old/New x AMP (F(2, 30) = 2.53, p = 
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Figure 14: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, Human-Dog experiment
Figure 6.1: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  P1  latency  in  the  Human-Dog 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P1 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  There  was 
significant  3-way  interaction  (Old/New  conditions  X  Hemispheres  X 
Anterior/Middle/Posterior  regions).  Over  the  anterior  regions,  the  Old 
condition did not significantly differ from the New condition. Over the middle 
regions, the old condition did not significantly differ from the new condition. 
Over  the  posterior  regions,  there  was  significant  interaction  between  the 
Old/New conditions and the Hemispheres. The dog faces following the new 
barks elicited larger amplitudes than the dog faces following the old barks 
over  the  right  posterior  regions.  The  dog  faces  did  not  elicit  different 
amplitudes between those following the new barks and those following the old 
barks over the left posterior regions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 
64 electrodes. The contour indicates the significant area.
.10) and Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 1.37,  p = .26) interactions were 
not significant. However, the Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere interaction (F(2, 
30) = 7.44,  p = .00) was significant. Over the anterior, middle, and posterior 
regions the simple main effect of Old/New was not significant,  Fs(1, 15) = 
1.67, 3.26, and 3.05, respectively, all  ps > .05. The Old/New x Hemisphere 
interaction  was  not  significant  at  anterior,  (F(1,  15)  =  1.20,  p =  .29)  and 
middle  (F(1,  15)  =  1.66,  p =  .22)  electrode  sites,  but  was  significant  at 
posterior electrode sites (F(1, 15) = 6.05,  p = .03). Over the right posterior 
regions, the dog faces following the new voices elicited larger amplitudes than 
the dog faces following the old voices (F(1, 15) = 6.91, p = .02), whereas there 
was no such effect over the left posterior regions (F(1, 15) = 0.42, p = .53). 
6.2.3 N170
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
0.54, p = .48), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.74, p = .40), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.14,  p = .87), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.31, p = .74) interactions were not significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 163ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms 
time window surrounding the peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New 
(F(1, 15) = 1.07, p = .32 ), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.38, p = .
55), Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.11,  p = .90), and Old/New x 




Figure 15: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, Human-Dog experiment
Figure 6.2: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  N170  latency  in  the  Human-Dog 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the N170 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition 
were  subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The 
amplitudes  were  not  significantly  different  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 16: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, Human-Dog experiment
Figure 6.3: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  P2  latency  in  the  Human-Dog 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P2 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. The amplitudes 
were not significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The 
grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
6.2.4 P2
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
1.09, p = .31), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.08, p = .78), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.65,  p = .53), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
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Figure 17: ERPs, Human-Dog experiment
Figure 6.4: The ERP responses to dog faces in the Human-Dog experiment. 
The red broken lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black solid lines 
show the ERP in the New condition. The grey bars indicate the time window 
to compute the average P1 amplitudes.
Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 1.32, p = .28) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was 223ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
surrounding this peak indicated that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
1.30, p = .27), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 1.82, p = .20), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.07,  p = .94), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.63, p = .54) interactions were  not significant.
6.3 Discussion
The  Human-Dog  experiment  compared  responses  to  the  dog  faces 
following the individually-identifiable voices (the Old condition) with those 
following the unknown voices (the New condition). The dog faces following 
the individually-identifiable voices elicited smaller P1 over the right occipito-
temporal region than the dog faces following the unknown voices.
As expected, the P1 amplitudes were larger in the New condition when 
the  categorization  levels  of  the  auditory and  the  visual  stimuli  were  more 
congruent and the results were consistent with those of the Dog-Car and the 
Dog-Human experiments. Dog faces have a default categorization at the basic 
level and the unknown human voices at the subordinate level, but the human 
voices in  the Old condition can be individually identified.  Hence,  the Dog 
faces were more congruent in categorization level with the unknown voices 
than with the individually-identifiable  voices.  Consistent  with the Dog-Car 
and the  Dog-Human experiments,  the  P1 amplitudes  were larger  when the 
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categorization  levels  are  more  congruent  (i.e.,  the  New  condition).  It 
demonstrated again that the direction of the P1 amplitude change does not 
depends solely on the categorization level of the auditory stimuli. The human 
voices were by default categorized at the subordinate level, while the barks 
were by default  at  the  basic  level,  but  both  auditory stimuli  increased  the 
visual P1 amplitude when they were more congruent with the categorization 
level of the visual stimuli.
Categorization-level  congruency  accounts  for  the  P1  effects  in  the 
Dog-Car, the Dog-Human, and the Human-Dog experiments. However, in the 
Dog-Dog experiment, no P1 effect was found. Responses to dog faces in the 
P1 time window were modulated by barks. But the topographic distribution of 
this effect was mainly over the right temporal region, which is different from 
the typical P1 scalp distribution. This effect was not replicated in any of the 
subsequent  experiments.  One  important  difference  between  the  Dog-Dog 
experiment from the other three is that both the auditory and the visual stimuli 
were from the same basic-level category. Participants might recognize them as 
from the same objects and this might give rise to the unique results in the Dog-
Dog experiment. To test this hypothesis, we conducted the fifth experiment, 
where both the auditory and the visual stimuli were also from the same basic-
level category. Instead of Dogs, however, the fifth experiment used the basic 
category of Human. Since the participants did not know any of the persons in 
the visual stimuli, they might conclude that the voices and the faces belong to 
the same person. This was the same as in the Dog-Dog experiment, but the 
Human-Human  experiment  differed  from  the  Dog-Dog  experiment  in  the 
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default  categorization level.  Human faces  are  by default  categorized at  the 
subordinate level, while dog faces are at the basic level.
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Chapter 7 Human-Human Experiment
7.1 Methods
The  Human-Human  experiment  was  the  same  as  the  Human-Dog 
experiment with the exception that the pictures in the visual target detection 
task were Chinese faces. The faces were the same as those in the Dog-Human 
experiment.  Sixteen  participants  (8  females,  mean  age  of  21.9)  from  the 
National  University  of  Singapore  were  included  in  the  experiment.  The 
participants were ethnically Chinese, so both the voices and the pictures were 
of own race.  Informed written consent  was obtained from each participant 
before the experiment. They were reimbursed at a rate of 9 SGD an hour for 
their time.  
7.2 Results
7.2.1 Behavioral Results
The average hit rate was 100%. The average reaction time was 484ms, 
and the average false alarm rate was 0%. As the number of the target trials was 
too small, no further analyses were conducted on the behavioral data.
7.2.2 P1
For the P1 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
0.04,  p = .84), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 30) = 1.18,  p = .32), Old/New x 
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Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 1.03,  p = .33), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 30) = 0.02, p = .98) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was  117ms.  The  analysis  of  the  mean  amplitudes  within  the  20ms  time 
window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 
15) = 0.22, p = .65), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 30) = 1.18, p = .32), Old/New 
x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.22, p = .65), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 30) = 0.02, p = .98) interactions were not significant.
7.2.3 N170
For  the  N170  half  area  latency,  the  main  effect  of  Old/New,  the 
Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 1.27, p = .28), Old/New x Channel Group 
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Figure 18: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, Human-Human experiment
Figure 7.1: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  P1  latency  in  the  Human-Human 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P1 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. The amplitudes 
were not significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The 
grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
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Figure 19: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, Human-Human experiment
Figure 7.2: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the Old and the New conditions at the N170 latency in the Human-Human 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the N170 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition 
were  subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The 
amplitudes  were  not  significantly  different  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 20: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, Human-Human experiment
Figure 7.3: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference between 
the  Old  and  the  New  conditions  at  the  P2  latency  in  the  Human-Human 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P2 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. The amplitudes 
were not significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The 
grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
(F(2, 30) = 0.43,  p = .66), and Old/New x Hemisphere Channel Group (F(2, 
30) = 1.15, p = .33) interactions were not significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 154ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms 
time window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New 
(F(1, 15) = 0.67, p = .43), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 1.54, p = .
27), Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.29,  p = .75), and Old/New x 
Hemisphere x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 1.05, p = .36) interactions were not 
significant.
7.2.4 P2
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 15) = 
3.89, p = .07), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 3.09, p = .10), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 2.15,  p = .13), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 1.03, p = .37) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was  217ms.  The  analysis  of  the  mean  amplitudes  within  the  20ms  time 
window surrounding the P2 peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New 
(F(1, 15) = 0.01, p = .94), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 15) = 0.09, p = .
77), Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 30) = 0.67,  p = .52), and Old/New x 




The  Human-Human  experiment  compared  responses  to  the  human 
faces following the individually-identifiable voices (the Old condition) with 
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Figure 21: ERPs, Human-Human experiment
Figure  7.4:  The  ERP  responses  to  human  faces  in  the  Human-Human 
experiment. The red dotted lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black 
solid lines show the ERP in the New condition. The grey bars indicate the time 
window to compute the average P1 amplitudes.
those following the unknown voices (the New condition). The P1 amplitudes 
were not significantly different between the Old and the New conditions.
The  results  in  this  experiment  partly  replicated  the  findings  of  the 
previous experiments. As in the Dog-Dog experiment, there was no effect on 
the P1 component. Unknown human voices and human faces were categorized 
at  the  subordinate  level,  while  the  learned  voices  could  be  individually 
identified. Hence, the human faces were more congruent with the unknown 
voices  than  with  the  known voices,  but  the  human faces  in  the  congruent 
condition  did  not  elicit  larger  P1  amplitudes.  This  suggests  that  early 
responses  to  visual  stimuli  did  not  differ  between  the  Old  and  the  New 
condition  and  indicates  that  the  categorization-level  congruency  effect 
observed in the Dog-Car, the Dog-Human, and the Human-Dog experiments 
occurs only when the auditory and the visual stimuli belong to different basic-
level categories. Early visual responses at the posterior regions do not further 
increase when the auditory and the visual stimuli belong to the same basic-
level category and this is true regardless of the default categorization level of 
visual stimuli. Dog faces were by default categorized at the basic level, while 
human faces were by default categorized at the subordinate level, but the early 
visual responses at the posterior regions to neither dog faces in the Dog-Dog 
experiment nor human faces in the Human-Human experiment increased when 
the auditory and the visual stimuli were congruent in categorization level.
However,  not  all  the  results  in  the  Dog-Dog  experiment  were 
replicated. In the Dog-Dog experiment, there was an early response difference 
over  the  right  temporal  electrode  sites.  This  effect  was  not   found  in  the 
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Human-Human experiment. In fact, early responses over the right temporal 
electrode sites was not observed in any of the experiments following the Dog-
Dog experiment.
The early response difference might be related multisensory integration 
(Stevenson & James, 2009; Barraclough, Xiao, Baker, Oram, & Perrett, 2005). 
While  the  auditory  and  the  visual  stimuli  were  obviously  from  different 
objects, participants may process the dog faces and the barks as from the same 
dogs. Preceding dog faces with barks could lead to integration of the barks and 
the dog faces to form multi-sensory object representations of dogs. The early 
response  difference  suggests  that  familiarity  with  the  barks  might  be 
facilitating this integration. Moreover, the facilitation might be more effective 
for dog faces than human faces. Dog faces are by default categorized at the 
basic level, while human faces are categorized at the subordinate level. People 
are  so sophisticated in  human face-voice integration (Campanella  & Belin, 
2007) that familiarity with the voices would not further benefit the process. 
Thus,  there  was  significant  early  response  difference  in  the  Dog-Dog 
experiment, but not in the Human-Human experiment.
We  argued  that  two  factors  were  particularly  important  for  the 
preceding auditory stimuli to modulate the processing of the visual stimuli. 
One was whether the auditory and the visual stimuli belong to the same basic-
level category. The other was the categorization-level congruency between the 
auditory and the visual stimuli. It follows that the categorization level of the 
visual  stimulus  needs  to  be  processed  before  the  auditory  and  the  visual 
stimuli can be compared. However, the modulation of the preceding sounds 
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appeared  as  early  as  on  the  P1  component.  Though  categorization  at  the 
superordinate level (i.e., living or non-living objects) could occur as early as 
70ms  after  stimuli  onset,  differentiation  between  processing  at  different 
categorization levels was reported at a much later stage (Large et. al., 2004). 
One explanation is that the visual stimulus categories were known even before 
the visual stimulus onset. This allowed the modulation effects of the preceding 
sounds to occur early. In all five experiments above, the category of the visual 
stimuli was the same throughout the experiments. Participants could anticipate 
the basic-level category of the visual stimuli. This allowed comparison of the 
basic-level  categories  and  categorization  level  congruency  between  the 
auditory and the visual  stimuli  before visual  stimulus onset.  Therefore,  the 
modulation effects could be effective at an early stage of visual processing. 
To  understand  the  effect  of  expectation,  a  final  experiment  was 
conducted.  An  auditory  stimulus  was  followed  by  a  visual  stimulus,  but 
instead of from only one stimulus category, the visual stimulus could be from 
any of the three basic-level categories: Dog, Car, or Human. If anticipation of 
the basic-level category of the visual stimulus does not matter, the results in 
the Dog-Mix experiment should replicate the findings in the Dog-Dog, the 
Dog-Car, and the Dog-Human experiments. Attention, as reflected in the P1, 
should increase for the human faces, decrease for the cars, and not change for 
the dog faces.  Otherwise,  conceptual  categorization of the visual stimuli  is 
required  after  visual  stimulus  onset  for  preceding  sounds  to  affect  visual 
stimulus processing, in which case the early response differences should be 
eliminated.
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Chapter 8 Dog-Mix Experiment
8.1 Methods
The Dog-Mix experiment used the same sound training procedure as in 
Experiments 1 - 5. During the EEG recording, participants performed a target 
detection task. Participants heard a sequence of dog barks. Half of the barks 
were learned in the training phase and the other half  were new. Instead of 
presenting the barks only once, each dog bark was repeated three times non-
consecutively. A picture from one of three categories (a dog face; a front view 
of  a  car;  a  human  face)  followed  each  bark  presentation.  The  Dog-Mix 
experiment used the same pictures as Experiments 1-5. All the human faces 
were Chinese faces. There were in total 180 upright pictures and 18 inverted 
target pictures. The categories of the three pictures that followed the same bark 
were  counterbalanced  across  participants  and  barks,  using  a  Latin  square 
design (see Table 1). Twenty-four participants (13 females, mean age of 21.5) 
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Table 22: Counterbalance of the auditory and the visual stimuli, Dog-Mix experiment
Table  8.1:  The  assignment  of  barks  to  picture  categories  across  bark 
repetitions is illustrated. E.g., Dog-Car-Human indicates that when the bark 
was presented for the first time, it was followed by a dog face; when the bark 
was presented for the second time, it was followed by a car; and when the 
bark was presented for the third time, it was followed by a human face.
from the National University of Singapore were included in the experiment. 
The participants  were ethnically Chinese,  so the human-face  pictures  were 
own-race faces. Informed written consent was obtained from each participant 




The  average  hit  rate  was  97.45%.  The  average  reaction  time  was 
558ms, and the average false alarm rate was 0.58%. As the number of the 




For the P1 half area latency the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
0.00,  p = .95), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 46) = 1.26,  p = .29), Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.12,  p = .73), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 46) = 0.19, p = .83) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was  113ms.  The  analysis  of  the  mean  amplitudes  within  the  20ms  time 
window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 
23) = 1.30, p = .27), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 46) = 2.41, p = .10), Old/New 
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x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 4.04, p = .06), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 46) = 0.04, p = .96) interactions were not significant. 
8.2.2.2 Cars
For the P1 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
1.16,  p = .29), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 46) = 0.22,  p = .80), Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.10,  p = .75), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 46) = 1.63, p = .21) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was  113ms.  The  analysis  of  the  mean  amplitudes  within  the  20ms  time 
window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 
23) = 0.05, p = .82), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 46) = 0.22, p = .80), Old/New 
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Figure  23: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, dog faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.1: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to dog 
faces between the Old and the New conditions at the P1 latency in the Dog-
Mix experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time 
window  surrounding  the  P1  peak.  The  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  New 
condition were subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. 
The amplitudes were not significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
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Figure 25: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, human faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.3: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to human 
faces between the Old and the New conditions at the P1 latency in the Dog-
Mix experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time 
window  surrounding  the  P1  peak.  The  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  New 
condition were subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. 
The amplitudes were not significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 24: Scalp distribution of the P1 difference, cars, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.2: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to cars 
between the Old and the New conditions at the P1 latency in the Dog-Mix 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P1 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. The amplitudes 
were not significantly different between the Old and the New conditions. The 
grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.02, p = .89), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 46) = 0.75, p = .48) interactions were not significant.
8.2.2.3 Human Faces
For the P1 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
1.16,  p = .29), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 46) = 0.40, p = .67), Old/New x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.12,  p = .73), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 46) = 0.19, p = .83) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P1 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was  106ms.  The  analysis  of  the  mean  amplitudes  within  the  20ms  time 
window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 
23) = 0.16, p = .70), the Old/New x AMP (F(2, 46) = 0.06, p = .94), Old/New 
x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 1.18, p = .20), and Old/New x AMP x Hemisphere 
(F(2, 46) = 0.09, p = .91) interactions were not significant.
8.2.3 N170
8.2.3.1 Dog Faces
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New F(1, 23) = 
0.31, p = .58), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 3.76, p = .06), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.15,  p = .86), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.14, p = .88) interactions were not significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 168ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms 
time window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New 
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Figure 26: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, dog faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.4: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to dog 
faces between the Old and the New conditions at the N170 latency in the Dog-
Mix experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time 
window surrounding the N170 peak.  The averaged amplitudes  in  the  New 
condition were subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. 
The amplitudes were not significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 27: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, cars, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.5: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to cars 
between the Old and the New conditions at the N170 latency in the Dog-Mix 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the N170 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition 
were  subtracted  by  the  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  Old  condition.  The 
amplitudes in P9/P10 channels were significantly different between the Old 
and  the  New  conditions.  The  grey  dots  indicate  the  location  of  the  64 
electrodes. The contours indicate the significant area.
(F(1, 23) = 0.04, p = .84), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 1.14, p = .
30), Old/New x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.07,  p = .93), and Old/New x 
Hemisphere x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.18, p = .84) interactions were not 
significant.
8.2.3.2 Cars
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
0.65, p = .43), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 1.01, p = .33), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 2.14,  p = .13), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.03, p = .97) interactions were not significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 167ms. The analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms 
time window surrounding this  peak revealed a  marginally significant  main 
effect  of  Old/New  (F(1,  23)  =  4.14,  p =  .05).  Although  the  Old/New  x 
Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 2.04, p = .17) and Old/New x Hemisphere x Channel 
Group (F(2, 54) = 0.52, p = .60) interactions were not significant, the Old/New 
x Channel Group interaction (F(2, 46) = 3.63, p = .03) was significant. Cars in 
the Old condition elicited a significantly larger N170 than cars in the New 
condition over the lateral channel group (i.e., P9/P10: F(1, 23) = 7.32, p =  .
01), but not the other two channel groups (P8/P7:  F(1, 23) = 3.06,  p = .09; 
PO8/PO7: F(1, 23) = 1.23, p = .28).
8.2.3.3 Human Faces
For the N170 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) 
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= .04,  p =  .84),  the   Old/New x  Hemisphere  (F(1,  23)  =  1.14,  p =  .30), 
Old/New  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  0.48,  p =  .62),  and  Old/New  x 
Hemisphere x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.38, p = .69) interactions were not 
significant.
The  peak  latency  of  the  N170  derived  from  the  grand  average 
waveforms was 153ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time 
window surrounding this peak revealed that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 
23) = 1.44,  p = .24), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.60,  p = .44), 
Old/New  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  1.18,  p =  .32),  and  Old/New  x 
Hemisphere x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 1.12, p = .33) interactions were not 
significant.
92
Figure 28: Scalp distribution of the N170 difference, human faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.6: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to human 
faces between the Old and the New conditions at the N170 latency in the Dog-
Mix experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time 
window surrounding the N170 peak.  The averaged amplitudes  in  the  New 
condition were subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. 
The amplitudes were not significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
 8.2.4 P2
8.2.4.1 Dog Faces
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New  F(1, 23) = 
1.46,  p = .24), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.02,  p = .89), and 
Old/New  x  Hemisphere  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  0.12,  p =  .89) 
interactions  were not  significant.  However,  the  Old/New x Channel  Group 
interaction (F(2, 46) = 3.97,  p = .03) was significant. The Old and the New 
conditions  were  different  only for  the  PO8/PO7 channel  group (PO8/PO7: 
F(1, 23) = 4.67, p = .04; P8/P7: F(1, 23) = 1.63, p = .21; P10/P9: F(1, 23) = 
0.53, p = .47).
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Figure 29: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, dog faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.7: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to dog 
faces between the Old and the New conditions at the P2 latency in the Dog-
Mix experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time 
window  surrounding  the  P2  peak.  The  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  New 
condition were subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. 
The amplitudes were not significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was 237ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
surrounding this peak indicated that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
0.04, p = .84), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 2.22, p = .15), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.07,  p = .93), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.53, p = .59) interactions were not significant.
8.2.4.2 Cars
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
0.61,  p = .44), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 0.10,  p = .75), and 
Old/New  x  Hemisphere  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  0.12,  p =  .89) 
interactions were not significant.  However, the Old/New x Channel Group 
interaction (F(2, 46) = 3.97,  p = .03) was significant. The Old and the New 
conditions  were  different  only for  the  PO8/PO7 channel  group (PO8/PO7: 
F(1, 23) = 4.67, p = .04; P8/P7: F(1, 23) = 1.63, p = .21; P10/P9: F(1, 23) = 
0.53, p = .47). 
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was 234ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
surrounding this peak indicated that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
3.36,  p = .08), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 1.88,  p = .18), and 
Old/New  x  Hemisphere  x  Channel  Group  (F(2,  54)  =  0.20,  p =  .82) 
interactions  were not  significant.  However,  the  Old/New x Channel  Group 
interaction (F(2, 46) = 3.75, p = .03) was significant. Cars in the Old condition 
elicited  a  significantly smaller  P2 than  cars  in  the  new condition  over  the 
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Figure 31: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, human faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.9: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to human 
faces between the Old and the New conditions at the P2 latency in the Dog-
Mix experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time 
window  surrounding  the  P2  peak.  The  averaged  amplitudes  in  the  New 
condition were subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. 
The amplitudes were not significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
Figure 30: Scalp distribution of the P2 difference, cars, Dog-Mix experiments
Figure 8.8: Topographic distribution of the ERP response difference to cars 
between the Old and the New conditions at the P2 latency in the Dog-Mix 
experiment. The ERP amplitudes were averaged within the 20ms time window 
surrounding the P2 peak. The averaged amplitudes in the New condition were 
subtracted by the averaged amplitudes in the Old condition. The amplitudes in 
P9/P10 channels were significantly different between the Old and the New 
conditions. The grey dots indicate the location of the 64 electrodes.
lateral channel group (i.e., P9/P10: F(1, 23) = 6.32, p = .02), but not the other 
two channel groups (P8/P7:  F(1, 23) = 1.98,  p = .17; PO8/PO7:  F(1, 23) = 
1.05, p = .32).
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Figure 32: ERPs, dog faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.10: The ERP responses to dog faces in the Dog-Mix experiment. The 
red broken lines show the ERP in the Old condition.  The black solid lines 
show the ERP in the New condition. The grey bars indicate the time window 
to compute the average P1 amplitudes.
8.2.4.3 Human Faces
For the P2 half area latency, the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
0.03, p = .86), the Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23) = 1.71, p = .20), Old/New 
x Channel Group (F(2, 46) = 1.08,  p = .35), and Old/New x Hemisphere x 
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Figure 33: ERPs, cars, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.11: The ERP responses to cars in the Dog-Mix experiment. The red 
dotted lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black solid lines show the 
ERP in the New condition. The grey bars indicate the time window to compute 
the average P1 amplitudes.
Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 0.50, p = .61) interactions were not significant.
The peak latency of the P2 derived from the grand average waveforms 
was 246ms. Analysis of the mean amplitudes within the 20ms time window 
surrounding this peak indicated that the main effect of Old/New (F(1, 23) = 
2.11,  p = .20), Old/New x Hemisphere (F(1, 23)= 0.59, p = .45), Old/New x 
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Figure 34: ERPs, human faces, Dog-Mix experiment
Figure 8.12: The ERP responses to human faces in the Dog-Mix experiment. 
The red dotted lines show the ERP in the Old condition. The black solid lines 
show the ERP in the New condition. The grey bars indicate the time window 
to compute the average P1 amplitudes.
Channel  Group (F(2,  54)  = 0.18,  p =  .83),  and Old/New x Hemisphere  x 
Channel Group (F(2, 54) = 1.26, p = .29) interactions were not significant.
8.3 Discussion
The  Dog-Mix  experiment  compared  responses  to  visual  stimuli 
following individually identifiable barks with those following unknown barks. 
There was no significant effect from the preceding barks on the P1 component 
for any category of the visual stimuli. For the N170, responses to cars, but not 
dog faces or human faces, were modulated by the preceding sounds. Cars in 
the Old condition elicited a larger N170 than cars in the New condition.
This experiment failed to find similar effects on the P1 component as 
the  Dog-Dog,  the  Dog-Car,  and  the  Dog-Human  experiments  did.  This 
outcome suggests that in the earlier experiments anticipation of the basic-level 
category of the visual stimuli contributed to the effect of preceding sounds on 
the P1 component. Given the visual stimuli in this experiment could be dog 
faces, cars, or human faces, participants were less likely to know the basic-
level category of the visual stimulus before stimulus onset. Hence, to judge 
whether the auditory and the visual stimuli belonged to the same basic-level 
category, and/or shared a categorization level, processing of the visual stimuli 
had to reach the conceptual categorization stage. Though superordinate-level 
categorization can occur as early as 70ms, conceptual categorization of visual 
stimuli was more often observed in the N170 time window. While information 
about the basic-level categories of the visual stimuli might advance the effects 
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from the preceding sounds to the P1 time range, difficulty in predicting the 
basic-level category of the visual stimulus could eliminate the early effects. 
Although  the  N170  had  not  been  affected  in  the  previous  five 
experiments, here larger N170 amplitudes were obtained in the Old condition 
than the New condition, but only for the car stimuli.. It is possible that the 
effect was related to anticipation of the visual stimulus category. Visual stimuli 
in this experiment could be from one of three basic-level categories, among 
which only dog faces were from the same basic-level category as the auditory 
stimuli (i.e., barks). It was more likely to encounter a visual stimulus from a 
different basic-level category (i.e.,  Car or Human) than one from the same 
basic-level category (i.e., Dog). Furthermore, by default, unknown barks, dog 
faces,  and  cars  are  categorized  at  the  basic  level,  while  human  faces  are 
categorized at the subordinate level. It was also more likely to see a visual 
stimulus  at  the  basic  level  than  at  the  subordinate  level.  Therefore,  after 
hearing  an  unknown  bark,  participants  were  more  likely  to  see  a  visual 
stimulus at a congruent categorization level (i.e., cars or dog faces) than at an 
incongruent level (i.e., human faces). Previous research showed that category 
expectation modulated the N170 amplitudes (Aranda, Madrid, Tudela, & Ruz, 
2010), such that valid prediction of the visual category increased the N170 
amplitude for words, but decreased the amplitude for human faces. Enhanced 
N170 amplitude for  cars in  our  experiment  is  consistent  with the category 
expectation effect for words in their study.
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Table 8.2: Summary of the results in all six experiments
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Chapter 9 General Discussion
This study examined the effect of conceptual categorization on visual 
processing in a cross-modal context. Participants heard auditory stimuli that 
were either new or which they had previously learned to associate with the 
name of a dog or a person. Each sound was followed by a visual stimulus, 
with  a  constant  interval  between  sound  offset  and  visual  stimulus  onset. 
Potentially,  the  learned  sounds  could  be  categorized  at  a  more  individual 
categorization level than the new sounds. The default categorization level of 
the visual stimuli varied  across experiments: Dog faces and cars are usually 
categorized  at  the  basic  level,  while  human  faces  are  categorized  at  the 
subordinate  level.  We  expected  the  categorization  level  of  the  sound  to 
modulate the ERP components elicited by the subsequent visual stimulus (e.g., 
the P1 component).
9.1 Cross-modal Priming and Visual Processing
The main findings in this study were that the P1 responses to the visual 
stimuli were differently modulated in different experiments. In the Dog-Dog 
experiment  and  the  Human-Human  experiment,  there  was  no  effect  of 
preceding sounds on the P1 component. In the Dog-Human experiment, the P1 
amplitudes were larger in response to the human faces following learned dog 
barks than those following the new barks. In both the Dog-Car experiment and 
the Human-Dog experiment, the opposite pattern was observed. In the Dog-
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Car  experiment,  the  P1  amplitudes  were  smaller  in  response  to  the  cars 
following the learned dog barks than those following the new barks. In the 
Human-Dog experiment, the P1 amplitudes were smaller in response to the 
dog faces following the learned human voices than those following the new 
voices. In the Dog-Mix experiment, no effect from the preceding sounds was 
found on the P1 components for any visual stimuli.
9.2 P1 Modulation  as  a  Function  of  Categorization-Level  Congruency and 
Basic-Level Category
The results can be understood in light of the categorization levels and 
the basic-level categories of the auditory and visual stimuli. Among the visual 
stimuli, dog faces and cars are categorized at the basic level by default, while 
human faces are categorized at the subordinate level by default. Regarding the 
auditory stimuli, dog barks that had not been associated with names would be 
categorized at the basic level by default, while human voices are categorized 
at  the  subordinate  level.  However,  participants  in  different  experiments 
learned to associate some dog barks and human voices with names, so those 
dog barks and the human voices could be identified individually leading to a 
change in  the  categorization  level:  the  old  auditory stimuli  –  whether  dog 
barks or human voices – would now be categorized at a more individual level 
compared to the new sounds. This helps to account for the differential effects 
of the auditory stimuli on the P1 amplitudes in this study.
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We argued that  the  P1 responses  were  modulated  primarily by two 
factors: 1) the congruency between the basic levels of the auditory and the 
visual stimuli and 2) the congruency between the categorization level of the 
auditory stimulus and the default categorization level of the visual stimulus. 
The former determined whether the P1 components were modulated, while the 
latter influenced the direction of P1 amplitude change. This was particularly 
true  when  visual  stimuli  from only  one  basic-level  category  followed  the 
auditory stimuli (e.g., in the Dog-Human experiment, all visual stimuli came 
from one basic-level category, 'Human'). These results pertain only to the first 
five experiments. Results from the last experiment, where the visual stimuli 
came from three basic-level categories, will be discussed later.
In the first five experiments, the learned auditory stimuli did not affect 
the P1 amplitude when both the auditory and the visual stimuli were from the 
same  basic-level  category.  This  was  true  regardless  of  the  default 
categorization level  of the visual  stimuli.  In  the Dog-Dog experiment,  dog 
faces were categorized at the basic level. Though the auditory and the visual 
stimuli were from different dogs, they both belonged to the same basic-level 
category, 'Dog'. The P1 responses to the dog faces were not affected by the 
categorization level of the preceding barks. In the Human-Human experiment, 
human faces were categorized at the subordinate level and the P1 responses to 
the  human  faces  also  were  not  affected  by the  categorization  level  of  the 
preceding voices.
When the auditory and the visual stimuli were from different basic-
level categories, the visual stimuli that were more congruent in categorization 
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level with the auditory stimuli elicited larger P1 amplitudes. In the Dog-Car 
experiment, cars were categorized at the basic level. The new barks were also 
categorized at the basic level, but the old barks were individually identifiable 
and could be categorized at the subordinate level. Thus, the cars were more 
congruent in terms of categorization level with the new barks than the old 
barks. Therefore, the P1 responses to the cars preceded by the new barks were 
larger  than  those  preceded by the  old  barks.  Similarly,  in  the  Dog-Human 
experiment, because human faces are normally categorized at the subordinate 
level,  so  the  human faces  were more  congruent  categorically  with  the  old 
barks than with the new barks. Therefore, the P1 responses to the human faces 
preceded by the old barks were larger than those preceded by the new barks. 
Finally, in the Human-Dog experiment, the dog faces were categorized at the 
basic level, the old voices, like the old barks, were individually identifiable 
and  categorized  at  the  subordinate  level,  while  the  new  voices  were  less 
individualized. Therefore, the dog faces were relatively more congruent with 
the new voices than with the old voices and the P1 responses to the dog faces 
preceded by the new voices were larger than those preceded by the old voices. 
To  conclude,  the  results  from  the  three  experiments  indicate  that  the  P1 
amplitudes were larger when the categorization levels of the auditory and the 
visual stimuli were congruent.
This effect depends only on the whether the auditory and the visual 
stimuli belong to different basic-level categories. It does not matter whether 
they belong to different  superordinate-level  categories.  For instance,  in  the 
Dog-Car experiment, the dogs and the cars belonged to different categories at 
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both the basic level (i.e., dog vs. car) and the superordinate level (i.e., animal 
vs.  vehicle).  In  the  Dog-Human  experiment,  the  dogs  and  the  humans 
belonged to the different basic-level categories (i.e., dog vs. human), but they 
were in the same superordinate-level category (i.e., animal). However, in both 
experiments, categorization level congruency elicited larger P1 amplitudes.
9.3  Sensory  Processing  Modulation  as  a  Result  of  Cross-modal  Semantic 
Congruency 
But why were the P1 components modulated? Rogers and Patterson 
(2007)  proposed  a  parallel  distributed  model  for  object  representations. 
Following the view that object representations are distributed across different 
regions in the brain, they argued that the representations are stored in both the 
modality-specific regions and the amodal regions. While regions in sensory 
cortex store modality-specific features, the concepts that link the features are 
stored  in  the  anterior  temporal  cortex  and  are  represented  in  distributed 
patterns according to the similarities among features. Based on this view, we 
proceeded as follows to predict the effect of activated object representations 
on sensory processing of upcoming stimuli. Object representations are often 
multi-modal.  A dog has  four  legs,  can  bark,  and is  also covered  with  fur. 
Representations activated by features from one modality can spread activity to 
other  sensory  modalities.  Processing  of  the  subsequent  stimulus  in  those 
sensory  modalities  is  expected  to  be  affected.  More  specifically,  we 
hypothesized that a subsequent stimulus that is congruent with the activated 
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representation will  attract  more sensory processing resources.  In  the  visual 
modality, it may lead to larger P1 amplitude. 
But this only tells half of the story. The subsequent stimulus can be 
congruent  with  the  activated  representation  in  different  ways,  such  as 
categories and abstract levels. In some experiments, we observed larger P1 
amplitudes  when  the  categorization  levels  were  congruent  than  when  they 
were incongruent. These were experiments when the visual stimuli were from 
a different basic-level category compared to the auditory stimuli. But we did 
not find significant P1 differences in the Human-Human experiment. In the 
Dog-Dog experiment, dog faces after learnt barks elicited larger activities over 
the right  hemisphere,  though the categorization level  of the dog faces was 
more congruent with the new barks. In both experiments, the visual and the 
auditory stimuli were from the same basic-level category. It is possible that 
when both visual and auditory stimuli are from the same basic-level category, 
multisensory integration  is  involved  to  form a  unified  representation.  It  is 
commonly observed that multisensory stimuli elicit larger responses than the 
sum of unisensory responses. Evidence from intracranial recordings in human 
subjects (Calvert, 2001) suggests that auditory stimuli can modulate response 
phase  in  the  visual  cortex.  During  multisensory  integration,  higher  phase 
concentration  was  observed  compared  to  the  expected  sum of  unisensory 
responses. It is possible that a more informative auditory stimulus enriches 
subsequent  visual  processing,  especially  for  stimuli  that  were  not  at  the 
individual processing level.
As  reviewed  in  the  Introduction,  the  P1  component  has  also  been 
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linked  to  attention.  A  second  possibility  is  that  the  P1  component  was 
modulated  by attention.  Though early research  often  used a  spatial  cueing 
paradigm, the P1 component is also affected by non-spatial attention (Taylor, 
2002). Larger amplitudes are generally observed when the stimulus is attended 
to as compared to unattended. This is true even when no stimulus is actually 
presented (Mangun et al.,  2001) in that simply attending to the visual field 
elicits a larger P1.
But why was attention to the visual stimuli modulated? In our study, 
the modulation of the P1 components was related to cross-modal congruency 
between the auditory and the visual stimuli. This cross-modal congruency was 
semantic rather than perceptual. Though cross-modality interaction does not 
have to rely on top-down regulation (e.g., spatial or temporal relationship of 
inputs from different modalities), semantic congruency between the auditory 
and the visual stimuli can affect cross-modal interaction (Hein et. al., 2007). 
Semantic congruency can facilitate processing of the audiovisual stimuli that 
leads  to  faster  reaction  times  and  higher  accuracy  (e.g.,  Calvert,  2005; 
Laurienti et. al., 2004). In addition, ERP responses to multimodal stimuli are 
larger than the summation of the responses to unimodal stimuli (Talsma, Doty, 
& Woldorff, 2007). However, this enhancement seems to require attention to 
the sensory input from at least one of the modalities of the multimodal stimuli 
(van de Burg,  et.  al.,  2010).  Van de Burg and colleagues (2010) presented 
multimodal stimuli followed by visual targets in an attentional blink paradigm. 
The multimodal stimuli were audiovisual letters that could either be congruent 
(e.g., hearing F and seeing F) or incongruent (e.g., hearing F and seeing Z). In 
109
a series of experiments, they required participants to either attend to the visual 
target alone, to one sensory channel of the audiovisual stimulus and the visual 
target, or to both sensory channels of the audiovisual stimulus and the target. 
Across all experiments, attentional blink was observed. However, the semantic 
congruency effect on the attentional blink at the target was observed when at 
least one sensory channel of the multimodal stimulus was attended. When the 
multisensory stimulus was completely task irrelevant, no semantic congruency 
effect was found.
In contrast, if no attention is devoted to the multimodal stimulus, the 
response can be smaller than the sum of the responses to the unimodal stimuli 
(Talsma et al., 2007). This is true even when attention is devoted to a sensory 
channel, but not the stimulus location. For example, Talsma and colleagues 
(2007) presented participants with two streams of visual stimuli at the upper 
and the lower visual field. The stimuli in the lower visual field were either 
accompanied by auditory stimuli or not and the auditory stimuli could also 
occur in the absence of a lower visual field stimulus. The participant’s task 
was to detect the occasionally presented targets (i.e., a number), which could 
appear in the upper or the lower streams depending on the condition. When the 
lower stream was attended, responses to the multimodal stimuli were larger 
than the summation of the responses to the unimodal stimuli. However, when 
the upper stream was attended instead, responses to the multimodal stimuli 
were smaller than the summation of the unimodal stimuli in the lower visual 
field. Note that the reverse ERP response pattern between the attended and the 
unattended conditions  occurred  before  the  P1 component  in  their  study.  It 
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could  possibly  be  due  to  the  simple  multimodal  stimuli  used  in  their 
experiments (i.e., white square horizontal gratings in the visual modality and 
pips in the auditory modality). Moreover, the P1 amplitudes in the experiment 
were larger in the attended condition compared to the unattended one.
Considering the results from both studies (Talsma, et al., 2007; van de 
Burg,  et  al.,  2010),  it  appears that  semantic  congruency across audiovisual 
modalities can facilitate performance, but to benefit from this interaction, one 
has  to  attend to  the  sensory input  in  at  least  one  of  the  modalities  of  the 
multimodal  stimulus  (i.e.,  the  auditory  input,  the  visual  input,  or  both). 
Attention is necessary to bring about the semantic congruency effect. These 
conclusions can apply to our study. First, the high accuracy of the behavioural 
results on the visual stimuli suggested that participants did pay attention to the 
task (and therefore to the visual stimuli). This allowed cross-modal interaction 
at  the  semantic  level.  Our  experiments  showed  that  congruency  of 
categorization level can prompt increased attention to the stimuli.  Although 
the auditory and the visual stimuli belong to different basic-level categories, 
congruent  categorization  levels  may  act  to  facilitate  association  between 
different stimuli by increasing attention to at least one of them. On the other 
hand, the effect of the category-level congruency does not seem to increase 
attention to the visual stimuli when the stimuli from both modalities belong to 
the same basic-level modality. This resulted in no category-level congruency 
effect  on the  P1 components  in  the  Dog-Dog experiment  and the  Human-
Human  experiment.  It  is  possible  that  belonging  to  the  same  basic-level 
category attracted enough attention to the stimuli,  and category congruency 
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did not further increase attention.
Compared to  the cross-modal  binding by synchronized presentation, 
semantic congruency was considered as a top-down effect. In our experiments, 
this  top-down effect  seemed to occur  at  quite  an early stage  of  the visual 
stimulus  processing  (i.e.,  in  the  time  range  of  the  P1),  which  may  seem 
surprising. However, it has been shown that the P1 component is sensitive to 
top-down modulation.  Furthermore,  it  has been shown that,  while a 100ms 
SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony) was too short, 300ms is a sufficient SOA for 
a semantic congruency effect to occur (van de Burg, et al., 2010). Compared to 
simultaneous presentation of the auditory and the visual stimuli, the priming 
paradigm  used  in  our  study  allowed  more  than  100ms  for  the  semantic 
processing  to  occur.  The  visual  stimuli  were  presented  217ms  after  sound 
offset and the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was more than 617ms in all 
six  experiments.   Moreover,  in  the  first  five  experiments,  the  basic-level 
categories of the visual stimuli were known to the participants before visual 
stimulus  presentation,  which  may  have  further  facilitated  the  top-down 
process. As soon as the visual stimulus was presented, attention was readily 
brought to it.
Note that there was a significant difference between the Old and the 
New conditions over the right hemisphere in the Dog-Dog experiment. The 
amplitudes  in  the  old  condition  were more  positive  than  those  in  the  new 
condition. The difference occurred within the P1 range, but the topographic 
distribution  showed that  the  difference  peaked over  the  temporal  electrode 
sites.  This  is  different  from  the  P1  distribution,  which  spreads  over  the 
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occipito-temporal electrode sites. It might reflect the process of binding barks 
with the dog faces, given that it was mostly above the temporal lobe, but the 
neural sources of EEG signals can be quite far away from the peak responses 
observed over the scalp due to volume conduction (Luck, 2005). The design of 
the current study does not allow verification of this hypothesis.
9.5 N170 Component
Linking a dog bark or a human voice to a dog or a person by name 
allows the dog or the person to be individually recognized. However, in the 
first  five  experiments,  this  individualization  effect  did  not  affect  the  N170 
elicited by the visual stimuli. Previous studies demonstrated that stimuli that 
were categorized at  a more individual abstract  level  elicited a larger N170 
(e.g., Tanakan & Curran, 2001). Our results suggest that the effect of training 
participants  to  individually  recognize  the  auditory  stimuli  does  not 
immediately carry over to change the categorization level of the visual stimuli 
to a more individual level. In the Dog-Mix experiment, a difference between 
the old and the new conditions was observed within the N170 time window for 
car  stimuli.  These  results  may not  be  surprising,  however,  because  all  the 
visual stimuli were presented only once, and this means that there was only 
one opportunity for the association between the auditory and the visual stimuli 
to be established. Consider that participants had two-day learning sessions and 
far more exposure to the sounds before they could individually recognize most 
of the sounds in the old condition and that it requires far more learning before 
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a person can become a domain expert,  who can categorize objects  of their 
expertise at the subordinate level.
However, these N170 results should not lead us to hastily conclude that 
auditory  stimuli  do  not  influence  the  categorization  of  the  visual  stimuli 
because  N170  modulation  during  categorization  might  be  influenced  by 
attention  level.  Heisz,  Watter  and  Shatten  (2006)  reported  that  attention 
controlled whether repeating same-identity faces reduced the N170 amplitude. 
Viewing a sequence of same-identity faces progressively habituated the N170 
only when the faces appeared at the unattended location. Neither viewing a 
sequence of different-identity faces at the unattended location nor seeing the 
same-identity faces appear at the attended location led to attenuation of the 
N170. Attention to the faces, though face identity was task-irrelevant, seems 
able  to  reduce  the  N170  habituation  from  repetition.  Heisz  and  Shadden 
(2008)  further  examined  the  repetition  effects  of  the  faces  on  the  N170 
responses  when  the  faces  were  associated  with  personal  information, 
compared with control  faces  that  were  presented repeatedly with unrelated 
stories (e.g., rocks and trees). They found that the face repetition effect on the 
N170  was  attenuated  when  the  faces  were  associated  with  personal 
information. Therefore, as the N170 habituation is linked to neuronal response 
specificity  (Korinth,  Sommer,  &  Brenznitz,  2013),  both  attention  and 
associating  with  personal  information  can  help  the  N170 resist  habituation 
over repetition.
9.6 The Dog-Mix Experiment
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The final experiment deserves further comment because it was the least 
similar to the previous experiments in terms of design and results. There was 
no effect of the Old/New bark condition on the P1 responses to any of the 
three  categories  visual  stimuli.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  the  link 
between  the  prime  and the  target  changed  in  that  the  dog barks  could  be 
followed by visual stimuli from any of the three basic-level categories. The 
visual stimuli could be from the same (i.e., dog faces) or different (i.e., cars 
and  human  faces)  basic-level  category  as  the  barks.  Moreover,  the 
categorization level of the visual stimuli and the preceding auditory stimuli 
could  be  congruent  (e.g.,  cars  following  the  new barks,  with  both  stimuli 
categorized at the basic level) or incongruent (e.g., human faces, categorized 
at  the  subordinate  level,  following  the  new  barks). The  systematic 
relationships between stimuli in the previous experiment thus cannot be easily 
established in this experiment.
It is worth pointing out that the tasks in all experiments did not require 
participants  to  attend  to  the  auditory  stimuli.  Research  has  shown  that 
semantic congruency only affect cross-modal interaction when input from at 
least one of the modalities was attended (van de Burg, et. al., 2010). Though 
participants  may still  attend  to  the  barks  or  the  voices  in  our  study,  task 
instructions to attend to both modalities do not seem to be necessary. Neither 
did  our  tasks  explicitly  require  conceptual  categorization  on  the  part  of 
participants. Nevertheless, the results of our study suggest that both basic-level 




We live in a world that constantly requires conceptual categorization. 
Concepts help us understand the perceived information from the environment 
and to generate predictions. Instead of dealing with novel objects all the time, 
we  assign  objects  to  pre-existing  categories  and  assimilate  them  into  a 
hierarchy of knowledge. Thus, we use our top-down knowledge to associate or 
differentiate objects, rather than solely rely on bottom-up information.
Concepts  are  represented  both  within  and  beyond  sensory  cortex 
(Rogers  and  Patterson,  2007).  Neural  activity  specific  to  each  modality 
spreads  across  brain  regions  and  interacts  to  form a  coherent  multimodal 
representation  of  the  new  concept. By  the  same  token,  the  existing 
representation is able to interact with inputs from other modalities. Moreover, 
conceptual  representations  are  hierarchical  such that  members  in  the  same 
hierarchy that share an essential set of intra- or inter-modal features are said to 
form  a  category.  Research  shows  that  conceptual  categorization  based  on 
visual information can affect visual processing, which is an intramodal effect 
(e.g.,  Tanaka and Curran,  2001).  The current  study set  out  to  examine the 
effect of conceptual categorization on visual processing in cross-modal context 
(i.e.,  by preceding visual  stimuli  with  auditory stimuli  that  varied  in  their 
categorical similarity with the visual counterparts).
More  specifically,  we  measured  how  familiar  and  individually-
identifiable auditory stimuli  (e.g., barks from known or unknown dogs)  may 
affect responses to visual stimuli that briefly followed and were from various 
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basic-level categories. We found that the early responses to the visual stimuli 
were  modulated  by  the  experimental  manipulations.  Two  factors  are 
particularly important for these effects to occur: 1) whether the auditory and 
the visual stimuli belong to the same basic-level categories, and if not, 2) the 
audiovisual  congruency of  the categorization  levels.  Early visual  responses 
were not further increased if the auditory and the visual stimuli belonged to 
the same basic-level category, but they  were enhanced if the categorization 
levels  were  congruent  between  the  auditory  and  the  visual  stimuli  from 
different  basic-level  categories.  It  is  possible  that  attention  was  also 
modulated.
Studies  examining  semantic  association  often  emphasize  category 
congruency  among  different  stimuli.  The  current  study  points  to  the 
importance  of  the  interplay  between  the  level  of  categorization  and  the 
congruency of the basic-level category in affecting visual object processing. 
The current study also provides knowledge about how multimodal conceptual 
categorization  affects  unimodal  perceptual  processing  by  putting  it  in  the 
context of cross-modal processing. Previous research on categorization levels 
often involved only one modality, especially the visual modality. As concepts 
involve information from different modalities, we also need to understand how 
categorization levels function across modalities. Moreover, tasks in this study 
are perceptual and required no attention to the auditory modality. Results from 
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